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Abstract 
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Introduction: Concerned with climate, concerned with change 
Jerneja Penca* 
Just as climate change as a physical process takes place, so does thinking about it in social terms. The 
present collection of working papers finds its origin in a candid curiosity about a particular aspect of 
the phenomenon of climate change – namely the perception of the concept by the body of International 
Environmental Law (IEL) which created the framework within which climate change was initially 
addressed, but from which it has since conceptually distanced itself. 
Today, climate change is presented as one of the major challenges of contemporary global 
governance. The very existence of a specific climate research strand, “Climate Governance: 
Institution-Building and the EU” as one of six, within the Global Governance Programme emphasises 
the fact that, this is a crucial issue to address, within the international community. 
The problem of global warming is of concern on a number of distinct fronts. Scientific evidence is 
increasing in both quantity and quality; predictions are ever more accurate and scepticism receives less 
public attention than it did some years ago. Public encouragement for action is often initiated by local 
knowledge about weather patterns and values, or as a consequence of perceived moral responsibilities 
towards nature and others. Support for action on climate change has been mobilised in forms as 
diverse as the creation of networks of cities devoted to energy-efficiency and renewable energy, the 
organisation of ‘meat-free days’, or more explicit policy initiatives. The language conveying the sense 
of urgency and the level of ambition has become popular in political rhetoric, and is frequently present 
in mass media: the coverage of the Rio+20 summit was not comparable to that dedicated to the 
Conferences of Parties to the UNFCCC treaty. At least symbolically, these aspects are significant 
when noting the ‘omnipresence’ of climate change. But beyond rhetorical debate, the issue has also 
been accepted within political and legal spheres, with a number of concrete programmes, tentative 
targets and laws which had been created with the aim of reducing carbon emissions or adaptation to 
them. 
The focus on climate change is arguably greater than that placed on other environmental or 
developmental issues. In many ways, climate change is being isolated from the broader conceptual and 
political framework of sustainability, from which it had emerged. It is evolving into both an 
independent policy area and a distinct discipline of scholarly enquiry. This is manifested in an 
expanding variety of scientific and scholarly journals, conferences, university courses, and 
legislative/regulatory measures which focus on this problem area only. Many other environmental 
issues, such as water pollution, soil degradation or disappearance of habitats and species share much 
of the structural reasoning behind climate change and may deserve the same focus and detail, but are 
now treated as more marginal. In principle, the establishment of a governance field of climate change 
has supplemented, rather than eroded other issues. In practice, therefore, the attention placed on, and 
commitment given to ‘the environment’ as a whole, now appears to have been split between more 
areas of study. 
It is due to the combination of these two trends – the increased attention placed on the subject of 
climate change, and its independence from other policy concerns – that we have come to think and 
speak of the dominance of a climate rhetoric. One area to explore in this regard is the empirical 
question of the extent to which this is actually taking place. Another is the pragmatic query as to what 
the IEL’s (altered) perception of climate change implies. 
These issues became particularly obvious as the international community as well as individual 
governments began preparing for the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (“Rio+20”), 
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scheduled for June 2012. Rio+20 presented as a rare opportunity to look back and assess the IEL’s 
progress and, just as crucially, determine what progress in this context actually means. It was now apt 
to ask and demand the answer to the crude question of “Has IEL failed or succeeded?”. Its progress 
could be measured at least in the following ways: as physical improvements according to 
environmental indicators, as the imposition of ecological constraints and/or considerations onto other 
policy areas, or as the integration of environmental issues (so called ‘mainstreaming’) into any other 
discourse. 
Against this backdrop, the dominance of climate change was a phenomenon that could neither be 
simply acclaimed nor criticised. On the one hand, its presence allowed for a focused space to 
investigate and understand a specific problem. It also raised the profile of other non-traditional 
governance themes, as far as they were affected by or affecting the warming climate (such as the 
vulnerability of the poor, the provision of climate regulations such as ecosystem services etc.). From a 
legal perspective, a number of lessons could be learnt from the responses to climate change: some 
innovative initiatives since 1992 provide refreshing examples of regulation. 
On the other hand, the effectiveness of these same policies targeting climate change is highly 
contested by global emissions having reached the highest levels ever measured, and in view of visible 
social, economic and political results of this failure. Contrary to viewing the dominance of climate 
change as constructive for the articulation of environmental demands, it can also be argued that it is 
obscuring other equally pressing problems and setting harmful priorities, instead of initiating much 
needed systemic and structural changes to prevent further environmental degradation. The latter are 
believed to be characteristic of the much wider area of environmental or sustainable development law. 
Focusing on one issue only carries the risk of perpetuating the production of partial solutions that are 
beneficial to one specific challenge only, and are in conflict with others (as for example demonstrated 
by the experience with biofuels, afforestation projects, CO2 sequestration into geological formations, 
and proposals for geo-engineering). Finally, the dominance of climate change may lead not only to 
prioritisation, but also to a conflation of objectives, where different policy goals and fields are being 
equated, such as energy-climate, environment-climate, and low carbon-low environmental impact. 
A significant influence on the considerations about the meaning of progress in environmental 
issues and the relationship between the environment and climate was exerted by the intention of the 
Rio+20 to revisit the sustainability paradigm. To that end, the process set in motion by the Rio+20 
pioneered the concept of a ‘green economy’ and practically relegated to it the future of sustainability. 
However, destructive assumptions about the environment lie at the heart of the path depicted by the 
green economy, such as the concepts of market, economic growth, property and technology. Green 
economy seems to favour one particular interpretation of progress, namely that of the environment 
having instrumental value to the economic growth. Needless to point out, this understanding of the 
role of the environment came about on account of the more radical demands, which may also be (and 
have been) read into the IEL. To return to the concept of climate change – Rio+20 was an opportunity 
to question whether policies on this particular issue are part of the problem or a solution? Are they 
achieving or impeding the much-anticipated sustainability? Are they only a rhetorical cover for the 
perpetuation of the existing order that fuels ‘business-as-usual’, or is climate change an eye-opening 
phenomenon that will de-stabilise the harmful trajectory followed so far? 
These concerns may form the basis for more detailed study, but they do not generate a sound 
framework for proper analysis of the issues involved. The conference, which stimulated the present 
working papers, felt very much like a pioneering project exploring the field, and closer to fencing the 
garden than sowing the seeds. Instead, we have aimed at putting (some of the) relevant questions on 
the table and let the discussion run its own course. It is a rare luxury not to have a preconceived 
agenda, but instead allowing the very questions worth addressing shape the debate. 
We set off by evaluating the institutional, legal, policy and discursive mechanisms that have been 
used in tackling climate change, in no particularly structured manner. As lawyers, of course we were 
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inherently attracted to some aspects more than others, but attempted to allow for the analysis to be 
fairly broad in our selection of instruments, institutions, actors, science and ethics, and also in any 
other political and legal strategies that were used. We were keen on being both pragmatic and 
innovative, discussing both the positive and normative dimensions of present and future strategies. 
Equally, we wanted to include a critical perspective that draws attention to issues that have been 
obscured by the climate-centred agenda thus far, including power politics and the legal (and other) 
implications of this political prioritisation. Finally, we aimed at illustrating existing frustrations over 
certain frameworks and concepts that are being used by the IEL, amongst many other relevant 
questions. 
In short, the working papers resulting from the conference are concerned with climate and change. 
They deal with the interplay between the change in climate and the change in the societal responses, as 
well as their effective and necessary causal relationship. The working papers build on the 
straightforward premise that there is generally no disagreement about the need to act on climate 
change, but that the effects of the legal and discursive activities in this area are important to evaluate. 
In other words, rather than just contributing to the analysis of the increasing laws on climate change, 
and simply calling for more law, the working papers consider the implications of the perception of 
climate change as an independent category. They ask whether the separation of climate change from 
the broader sustainability dilemmas is not exactly part of the problem we are trying to resolve by 
environmental law. 
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The Fantasy of Success: Climate Change as Discourse 
Stephen Humphreys* 
In this paper, I aim to think through the significance of what we might call the ‘mainstreaming’ of 
climate science. In doing so, I attempt to explain the apparent paradox that, despite the increasing 
success of climate change science at discursive level, the failure of that language to frame a viable 
solution to the problems climate change poses appear ever starker. The inquiry draws on notions of 
(Foucauldian) ‘discourse’ and (Lacanian) ‘fantasy’, which I introduce by reference to two very 
different stories to have emerged recently from Norway, a poster child for climate change policy.  
A. Two Tales of Norway 
(i) Saviour of Europe? 
As I was writing a first draft of this paper in April 2012, the trial of Anders Breivik was underway in 
Norway. During this trial, as the reader will no doubt recall, Breivik claimed that Europe is in the grip 
of a pro-Islamic ‘cultural Marxism’.1 His evidence for this was the ubiquity of a certain kind of 
language promoting tolerance and multiculturalism, which he described as ‘an anti-European hate-
ideology designed to deconstruct European cultures and traditions, European identities, European 
Christendom and even European nation states.’2 His seemingly senseless attacks on Norway’s political 
youth was, therefore, intended to go directly to the heart of the problem.  
It is certainly true that the language of multiculturalism sometimes seems to be ubiquitous, not only 
in Norway, but throughout Europe, a kind of official lingua franca presenting a distilled liberalism in 
the tradition of John Stuart Mill. Certainly Europe’s twin institutional guardians of the good life – the 
European Union and the Council of Europe (Norway is only a member of the second) – have been at 
pains for many years to demonstrate their seriousness of intent by supporting, articulating and of 
course funding programs to promote an anti-racist, non-discriminating, hyper-‘tolerant’ utopia.3 
Indeed, the putative unity of a terminally fractious continent sometimes appears to depend on this 
formally ratified objective. 
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1
 According to Breivik’s manifesto, entitled The Rise of Cultural Marxism 
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MEINEU1Czts), ‘By active infiltration efforts since 1945, the Marxists … 
influence[d] the Labour movements, most universities, media and publishing companies, feminist movements, sexual 
emancipation movements, environmentalist movements, anti-discrimination movements, human right movements and 
other relating NGOs [sic].’ 
2
 Ibid. He adds: ‘And, as such, it is an evil genocidal ideology created for the sole purpose of annihilating everything 
European.’ 
3
 What is known as ‘fighting discrimination’ remains the key focus of the European Union’s human rights work, such as it 
is. See http://europa.eu/pol/rights/ (‘… the EU funds a wide range of activities to combat racism and xenophobia within 
its borders. Nearly a quarter of PROGRESS' €743 million budget is going towards fighting discrimination.’) See also the 
EU’s External Action Service website: http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/discrimination/index_en.htm. The longest 
standing source of policy statements on ‘tolerance’ is to be found at the Council of Europe’s European Commission 
Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI): http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/ (‘ECRI … monitors problems of 
racism, discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin, citizenship, colour, religion and language, as well as xenophobia, 
antisemitism and intolerance, prepares reports and issues recommendations to member States.’) 
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In this familiar register, Europe is, or aspires to become, a haven in which all religions and races 
are treated on a par, and in which a centuries-old Christian (not to mention aristocratic) hegemony has 
been effectively vanquished, so to speak, beneath a wave of substantive egalitarian ‘tolerance’. But of 
course, we all know this ‘multiculti’ vision is neither ‘Islamist’ nor Marxist – except perhaps insofar 
as it embraces some aspirational collective solidarity – analogous to (but surely utterly dissimilar 
from) the Umma or the Workers of the World. And we also know that the multicultural register is very 
far from describing the Europe we actually live in – which remains not only a place of common and 
casual racism, but one in which wealth inequalities seemingly soar to new heights daily, and in which 
it sometimes seems we are at war with ‘Islam’. Even formally, multiculturalism is generally thought, 
as Angela Merkel once put it, to have ‘utterly failed’.4  
So Anders Breivik, who explained that he had acted to ‘save’ Europe from itself, is a fantasist. By 
that I mean, Breivik acts as though he believes everything that is said to him is actually true, even 
though deep down he knows it is not. I will return to this notion of fantasy in a moment.  
Breivik had a particular loathing for a popular Norwegian song, which precisely caught the spirit of 
the register I have been referring to – and that he despised. Children of the Rainbow by Lillebjørn 
Nilsen is a loose translation of a 1970 song My Rainbow Race by the American folk singer Pete 
Seeger. During Breivik’s trial, 40,000 Norwegians gathered to sing this song outside the courthouse, 
led by Nilsen himself.
5
 The chorus (of the original Pete Seeger song) goes like this:
6
  
One blue sky above us  
One ocean lapping all our shore  
One earth so green and round  
Who could ask for more? 
The occasion was in many ways a wonderful affirmation of the principles of tolerance and solidarity in 
the face of an abhorrent and murderous neo-fascism. But at another level, one might wonder whether 
Norway too is living out a kind of collective fantasy.  
(ii) Saviour of the World? 
Viewed from the perspective of global climate change, Norway presents a fascinating case. The 
country is undoubtedly one of the world’s leading greenhouse gas emitters, thanks to its immense oil 
and gas industry, reckoned to be the world’s fifth largest oil exporter and second largest gas exporter 
in 2009 and 2010 respectively.
7
 That said, it is difficult to get a sense of Norway’s true contribution to 
global greenhouse gas emissions, as official figures do not record downstream emissions (i.e., those 
caused by people using Norwegian fossil fuels) from the country’s sizeable exports do not appear in 
the data. As a result, only a quarter of Norway’s total emissions are attributed to fossil fuels—those 
emitted in the extraction and transportation of oil and gas, which, at 13.4 million tonnes in 2011, are 
still sizeable, equal to the total emissions of neighbouring Lithuania.
8
 Carbon emissions due to the 
                                                     
4
 Gavin Hewitt, ‘”Failure” of Multiculturalism, BBC News, October 18, 2010, online at: 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/gavinhewitt/2010/10/failure_of_multiculturalism.html>, accessed October 20, 
2012. 
5
 Reproduced here: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IkbI-50bKXA>, accessed October 20, 2012. 
6
 Lyrics online here: <http://www.peteseeger.net/Rainrace.htm>, accessed October 20, 2012. 
7
 According to the CIA Factbook: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2176rank.html> and <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2183rank.html>, accessed October 20, 2012. See generally 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/no.html>, accessed October 20, 2012. 
8
 See Norway’s official statistics on <http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/01/04/10/klimagassn_en/>, accessed October 20, 
2012. For Lithuania, see data of the US EIA in footnote 9.  
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consumption of Norwegian oil and gas exports do not appear at all in the country’s carbon accounts. 
Thus, despite being an immense contributor to climate change, by simply mining and exporting the 
stuff, Norway consistently appears as a modest polluter in most lists of global emissions: ranked 68
th
 
in 2009 by the US Energy Information Administration.
9
 
At the same time, Norway consistently presents itself as deeply serious about addressing climate 
change. The country has one of the world’s longest running carbon tax regimes (dating from 1991—
although its efficacy has been questioned)
10
 and one of the sharpest emission reduction policies in the 
world, aiming to achieve carbon neutrality by 2030, with only one-third of those cuts to be achieved 
through offsets abroad.
11
 Norway is a leading investor in the UN REDD+ programme, backing an 
immense project in Indonesia to the tune of US $1 billion.
12
 Norway is moreover investing heavily in 
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), with an extensive programme currently underway in Mongstad, 
just north of the city Bergen, at a similar cost of US $1 billion.
13
 (Norway’s carbon tax had also 
spurred its state-owned oil company, Statoil to invest in CCS.
14
)  
Ironically enough, Norway can afford these investments in climate mitigation due to its oil and gas 
wealth. The country’s sovereign investment fund, Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM), 
founded on carbon tax proceeds as well as money derived from fossil fuel exports, and currently 
valued at over US $600 billion,
15
 is among the largest in the world. It is also perhaps the world’s most 
ethically strictured sovereign fund, refusing to invest in companies whose activities may produce, 
among other things, ‘serious or systematic human rights violations’ or (ever more ironically) ‘severe 
environmental harms’.16 Mining company Rio Tinto has thus been excluded from the Fund’s 
‘investment universe’ lest the NBIM be potentially funding environmental harm in, of all countries, 
Indonesia.
17
 God forbid.  
Add to this the fact that Norway is already feeling the effects of climate change,
18
 with new 
weather patterns in the North of the country directly affecting the patterns of cycles of appearance and 
flourishing of flora and fauna, altering food chains and impacting ultimately on the lifestyles of 
                                                     
9
 US Energy Information Administration, Total Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the Consumption of Energy, online here: 
<http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=90&pid=44&aid=8>, accessed October 20, 2012. 
10
 Emissions subsequently rose 15% to 2008. See UNEP’s Norway page: 
<http://www.unep.org/climateneutral/Default.aspx?tabid=231>, accessed October 20, 2012. See also Leila Abboud, ‘An 
Exhausting War on Emissions’, Wall Street Journal (September 30, 2008), Nicholas Choy & Caroline Chiu, 'FRE 525 
Problem Set 3 – Carbon Tax in Norway' (February 28, 2012), <http://blogs.ubc.ca/cyl501/2012/02/>, accessed October 
20, 2012. 
11
 See the Norwegian Finance Ministry website, <http://www.carbonneutralnorway.no>, accessed October 20, 2012. For 
analysis of this policy at the time of its introduction in 2008, see ‘Green Ambitions’, The Economist (January 21, 2008).  
12
 Letter of Intent between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on 
“Cooperation on reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation”, online here: 
<http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/SMK/Vedlegg/2010/Indonesia_avtale.pdf>, accessed October 20, 2012. 
13
 Andrew Ward, ‘Norway launches carbon capture and storage scheme’, Financial Times, June 28, 2011; Damien 
Carrington, ‘Whatever happened to carbon capture in the fight against climate change?’, The Guardian, May 9, 2012.  
14
 Choy and Chiu, above n 10. 
15
 According to the Fund’s own website, <http://www.nbim.no/en/> (accessed October 20, 2012), its value on October 6, 
2012 stood at 3.7 trillion NOK, or about US $650 billion. 
16
 See on the Fund’s website (<http://www.nbim.no/en/>, accessed October 20, 2012) under ‘Responsible Investments’ and 
‘Companies Excluded from the Investment Universe’. 
17
 It is, perhaps, beyond ironic that one of the 8,000 companies in which the NBIM invests, Kuala Lumpar Kepong, has 
been accused of carrying out deforestation in the precise area protected by the Norway-funded REDD+ programme in 
Kalimantan, according to recent reports. See Jonathan Watts, 'Norway accused of hypocrisy over Indonesian 
deforestation funding', The Guardian (December 1, 2011). 
18
 See the official State of the Environment website, <http://www.environment.no/Topics/Climate/Norways-climate/#D>, 
accessed October 20, 2012. 
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reindeer and their traditional herders among the Sami people living in the north of the country.
19
 
Norway is clearly not blind to the threats faced by ‘indigenous’ peoples, however: the country has 
been at the forefront of efforts at the UN to ensure Indonesia too protects the ‘rights’ of its ‘forest 
dependent peoples’, in particular ‘regarding their rights to traditional lands, territories and resources’.20 
At home, too, Norway claims that its Arctic policy will, for example, ‘safeguard the culture and 
livelihood of indigenous peoples’.21 
As the ironies mount, one might wonder how all this is supposed to work. It is true that nothing in 
the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol requires countries to include downstream emissions from oil and 
gas exports in their national inventories: Norway is therefore perfectly justified, from an international 
law perspective, in not doing so.
22
 But the resulting picture must necessarily fail to describe the actual 
contribution to climate change Norway is making, and upon which the Norwegian economy in fact 
depends. The obvious unspoken question is whether it is really coherent to run a national economy on 
fossil fuel exports while still aiming to lead the world in climate change mitigation?  
To achieve its ambitious carbon reduction goals, Norway will have to rely – as its current policies 
indicate – on copious quantities of carbon capture, on one hand, and of carbon offsets, on the other. So 
Norway is investing heavily in a technology that has yet to prove its longterm reliability, on one hand, 
and, on the other, on the promotion of REDD+ programs in developing countries and of carbon 
markets globally. In effect, Norway appears to reckon it can continue to mine its own principal local 
resource – fossil fuels – but only if it can use the proceeds to pay other countries not to mine their 
principal local resource – forests. Indeed, fossil fuel extraction is expanding in Norway: while overall 
emissions have been falling year-on-year, those produced in the oil and gas industry have been 
increasing annually (with occasional blips),
23
 a trend set to continue with the discovery of vast new oil 
resources in 2011.
24
  
Norway also sees itself as a ‘steward’ of the Arctic region.25 The country regularly claims that its 
approach to what is termed the ‘High North’ is the cornerstone of its foreign policy, and that it is 
working hard with other circumpolar governments to ensure that any engagement with the region 
‘must be done in a way that takes account of the environment, climate and interests of indigenous 
peoples’.26 But there is nevertheless general acknowledgement of the benefits that climate change may 
bring Norway due to its proximity to and links with the fast-melting polar cap. Here, in a talk largely 
                                                     
19
 Un Doc, A/HRC/18/35/Add.2, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, 
Addendum: The situation of the Sami people in the Sápmi region of Norway, Sweden and Finland, 6 June 2011, para. 60; 
Rachel Baird, ‘The Impact of Climate Change on Minorities and Indigenous Peoples’, Minority Rights Group 
International Briefing April 2008, 3.  
20
 A/HRC/21/7, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Indonesia, July 5, 2012, para. 109.36 
21
 Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, The High North - Visions and Strategies, Meld. St. 7 (2011–2012) Report to the 
Storting (White Paper) (December 2011) [hereafter ‘MFA White Paper 2011’], 38.  
22
 Norway is likewise keen to ensure that international law remains the relevant standard for assessing its actions (ibid., 
21;33).  
23
 See official statistics ‘Greenhouse Gases y Source’ at <http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/01/klima_luft_en/>, accessed 
October 20, 2012. 
24
 Marianne Stigset, ‘Norway Sees Longer Oil Era as North Sea Find Offers Hidden Giant’, Bloomberg (August 17, 2011). 
The article quotes Tim Dodson, Statoil’s exploration chief: iThis shows Norway still has the capacity to deliver world-
class discoveries. It’s probably the largest offshore oil discovery anywhere in the world this year. It has given the entire 
oil industry renewed optimism.’ 
25
 ‘The Government will seek to ensure that Norway is the best steward of the environment and the natural resources in the 
High North’. MFA White Paper 2011, 28. The report also speaks (at 11) of Norway as the ‘manager’ of ‘abundant fish 
stocks’.  
26
 Ibid., 14. 
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devoted to mutual climate change efforts, is what Norway’s Ambassador to Japan has to say on the 
subject of the Arctic:  
The melting of Arctic ice opens new perspectives for petroleum activity and new routes for 
maritime transport that will establish new commercial relationships. Opening the North East 
Passage brings Norway and Japan closer, shortening substantially your sailing routes to and from 
Europe. Increasing utilisation of the Arctic’s rich endowment of valuable natural resources, living 
marine resources, pollution and climate change all merge in a challenge that governments and 
other stakeholders must deal with in a way that ensures sustainable development.
27
 
Indeed: One ocean, one earth. Who could ask for more? 
On a close reading, the ‘High North’ White Paper—the principal concern of which is with ‘value 
creation’ in the Arctic (‘to ensure an integrated, ecosystem-based management regime that safeguards 
biodiversity and provides a basis for sustainable use of resources’)—discloses an uncomfortable truth 
about Norwegian climate change policy. In a section entitled ‘knowledge of the alarming pace of 
climate change’, the report lists the evidence that climate change is wrecking the Arctic. ‘At the same 
time’, the Paper notes, echoing Norway’s ambassador in Japan, ‘the melting ice is providing greater 
access to resources in the High North and opening up new opportunities for shipping’. In conclusion, 
‘the rapid pace of climate change and growing economic activity mean that it will be even more 
important to integrate environmental policy into all sectors’. The White Paper, in short, views 
‘environmental policy’ not in terms of arresting climate change, but as a means of managing—and 
indeed benefiting from—the ravages wreaked by climate change, as a means of retrieving ‘value’ from 
the cataclysm.  
(iii) Fantasy 
What is fantasy? My fantasy, to paraphrase the psychoanalyst-philosopher Jacques Lacan, is what I 
think you think about me; it is my idea about what I need to be in order to be desired by you, to be 
desirable, lovable, loved.
28
 Slavoj Zizek refers to fantasy as ‘the unknown known’29—something that 
drives us, that shapes our understanding of ourselves, that we bury ‘deep down’ (in our unconscious), 
but that we nevertheless remain ignorant of—indeed, something that drives and shapes us precisely 
because we don’t recognise it as our own. It is to other people that we attribute the signal for us to 
behave in a certain way: our fantasy is that the signal induces our behaviour, it is a fantasy because we 
believe ourselves to be merely reacting to the object of our fantasy, rather than initiating the whole 
thing ourselves. Crucially (in Lacan’s understanding), fantasy is ‘intersubjective’; it is ultimately 
neither mine nor yours, but something that comes into being through the signalling between us, and 
our interpretation of that signalling.
30
 It arises discursively.  
In Breivik’s fantasy, he has been called to ‘save’ (white, Christian) Europe from itself. By 
responding to the call, he demonstrates that he has understood the deeper (concealed) truth of 
European multiculturalism, a truth Europe dare not admit—that its vaunted ‘tolerance’ is ‘actually’ a 
destructive Marxist/Islamicist poison—but that has been disclosed to Breivik. Paradoxically, to save 
Europe he must destroy it. But deep down, we know the paradox is Europe’s own, not Breivik’s. By 
                                                     
27
 Address by H.E. Arne Walther Norwegian Ambassador to Japan, Presentation of Norwegian perspectives at Norway-
Japan Seminar on the Carbon Value Chain organized by the Embassy on 9 October 2009. 
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 Ibid. 
30
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acting out the contradiction in Europe’s account of itself with deadpan dispassion, Breivik claims to 
save the ‘real’ Europe. Brevik’s fantasy is, in part, Europe’s own fantasy.  
Norway’s fantasy, we might add, is one in which the country saves the world from itself. Norway 
becomes the perfect world citizen by acting out the deeper truth about the global economy, a truth the 
world refuses to admit—that we cannot both continue to exploit fossil fuel resources and address 
climate change—but that it has been vouchsafed to Norway to recognise. By acting in a contradictory 
manner, becoming rich from fossil fuels while achieving ‘carbon neutrality’, stewarding the Arctic 
‘environment’ by preparing for its destruction—Norway is merely acting out the contradiction in all 
climate change activities, in global climate policy as a whole. If, paradoxically, Norway actions would 
destroy the world in order to save it, that paradox is not Norway’s; it is inherent in global climate 
change policy as a whole. Norway merely shows its fitness for the world by acting out the 
contradiction with deadpan dispassion. Norway’s fantasy is, in fact, the fantasy of mainstream climate 
change discourse.  
Brevik’s fantasy is one in which the ubiquitous claim that Europe is a multicultural haven is, in 
fact, true: he can become Europe’s saviour only by reading the common call for ‘tolerance’ as, in fact, 
an SOS for help and, paradoxically, destroying the thing he claims to be rescuing. Norway’s fantasy is 
one in which the ubiquitous claims made for ‘sustainable development’ are, in fact, true: Norway can 
become the world’s saviour by turning the leaden profits of its climate harms into the golden 
investments of climate mitigation (and, paradoxically, destroying the thing it claims to love). 
I have referred here to ‘mainstream climate change discourse’. Let me now explain what I mean by 
this.  
B. The Paradox of Success  
Today, we stand in a paradoxical place on climate change. Twenty years on from the original Rio 
Summit, the language of climate change is everywhere. Everybody has learned to speak it; politicians 
can’t get by without it; we all count our carbon footprints and argue about the relative merits of 
REDD+. What we might call ‘the discourse of climate change’ has, we might say, been 
‘mainstreamed’. This is presumably a success. 
By discourse, I mean two things. First, of course, the familiar register of climate change itself – the 
particular language and assumptions associated with the ‘problem’: that the earth is in fact warming; 
that this phenomenon is due to human economic activity; that carbon emissions are the immediate 
cause; that the immediate consequence will be various ‘harms’; that to prevent ‘dangerous 
anthropogenic interference’ with the environment is a global good; and so on. But I also hope to 
retain, second, the specifically Foucauldian inflection in the term ‘discourse’: that any given discourse 
embeds a set of power relations; that discourses work through systems of inclusion/exclusion: by 
including certain ‘objects’ (words, ideas, acceptable enunciations, respectable authorities) and 
excluding others, and likewise, by privileging certain speakers, fora, and manners of speech, over 
others.
31
 That climate change discourse was ‘mainstreamed’ ought to bode well in this scenario: 
questioning some of the basic assumptions would then become unacceptable, in at least some powerful 
places. And that seems to have happened.  
Yet, despite the mainstreaming of climate change discourse, we seem no closer to figuring out how 
to fix the world. Indeed, in many respects, we seem further away from a solution than we did in 1992: 
in contrast to the mighty wind that filled the sails of the UNFCCC at that time, today we are scrabbling 
over a plethora of fragmented policy positions, with neither the will nor the capacity to agree on 
international measures that would effectively stop this metastasis even though its flowers are blooming 
all around us.  
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In short, even as climate change discourse has become increasingly ubiquitous, effective action to 
resolve global warming has remained distant, locked forever, it seems, in a waiting room of 
incrementalism.  
How to explain this paradox?  
The problem is not ignorance or denial. The science remains solid, ‘climategate’ notwithstanding, 
even inside the United States.
32
 Climate change denial, if it is better funded today than in the past, is 
now essentially a delaying tactic – as perhaps best illustrated by the Heartland Institute affair in 
2012.
33
 In truth, we know as much as we need to know about climate change. The problem is not that 
people need convincing and then action will follow; this is not a problem of publicity as so many 
NGOs appear to think (or ‘awareness raising’, as various UN agencies term it).34  
Rather what has happened, I suggest, is that the discourse of climate change has, in the course of its 
‘mainstreaming’, been reshaped and rearticulated to fit within a broader master-discourse (if I may be 
forgiven the term). Indeed, the ‘mainstreaming’ of climate change has depended upon its having 
adopted certain principles fundamental to other dominant discourses (economic, social, political) and 
discarding principles that had been specific to it (environmental). From this perspective, the success of 
‘climate change discourse’ also marks its failure.  
Let me illustrate this thesis with three example topics that abound in recent climate change 
discourse: technology transfer, human rights and ‘the market’.  
(i) Technology 
Technology has always been a key element of climate change discussions. However, it is worth 
recalling that the term has undergone a dramatic shift over the past 20 years. At Rio, the point was 
something called ‘transfer of technology’, the term that entered the UNFCCC. It was never entirely 
clear what ‘transfer of clean technology’ was supposed to mean. But there is little doubt that for many 
of the smaller participants in the climate negotiations – the countries that had contributed nothing to 
the problem but stood to lose everything because of it – technology transfer meant the active delivery 
of capacity and technical skill from rich countries to poor, in order to accelerate ‘development’.35  
‘Technology transfer’ was premised on a number of quite powerful grounds. One was global 
solidarity, a common term of art in the early 1990s that has all but vanished in the meantime. Since 
climate change affected (almost) everyone, and since different countries’ capacity to deal with it 
varied dramatically, the sensible approach seemed to be for everyone to pull together – this quaint 
principle underlay the UNFCCC.
36
 A second was the strong sense of history that prevailed in the still 
new postcolonial era: it was still widely acknowledged that wealthy countries owed their wealth, at 
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least in part, on historical colonisation and exploitation. Technology transfer provided one way 
(among others) to redress that debt.
37
 A third ground was old-fashioned social justice: since, as was 
becoming apparent, wealthy countries had effectively used up all the available atmospheric space for 
‘development’, it seemed just to share the benefits of that overuse rather than to lock in massive 
wealth disparities for good. A fourth ground, possibly the most persuasive of all, invoked Keynesian 
economics sense of the post-Marshall Plan era: it is a solid investment for stronger economies to 
sponsor weaker ones, it was thought, as it facilitates international trade, ultimately benefitting the 
strong economies themselves.  
These grounds may still appear compelling, but they no longer command authority. The virtue of 
‘solidarity’ has long since ceased to animate global political negotiation, and looks in retrospect rather 
as a rhetorical sop to smooth the entry of newly independent states into a harsh, in practice, global 
economy. The soft decline of Keynesian economics in the post-Cold War era has also been well 
documented.
38
 Colonial guilt too seems to be deeply unfashionable: if we speak about a ‘colonial 
legacy’ at all anymore it is mainly to speculate as to whether developing countries without one are 
worse off.
39
 And as for the shrinkage of atmospheric space: well, now we are going to innovate our 
way out of it. This, of course, is how we talk about technology and climate change today: the 
responsible response is to invest in the green economy.  
These are non-trivial changes of register. The language of ‘technology transfer’ was for a while a 
locus of much contestation in the international climate change negotiations.
40
 But it has been slowly 
siphoned out of the climate change legal regime. Initially handed over to a (near powerless) Expert 
Group on Technology Transfer, whose mandate has constantly shifted, the term has over time, had less 
and less to do with ‘transfer’ and more and more to do with ‘creating an enabling environment for 
foreign investment’.41 The term ‘technology transfer’ has been dropped entirely from the UNFCCC 
regime’s current technological hope, the Technology Mechanism.42 So: fingers crossed for the green 
economy: a lot is riding on it! 
(ii) Human rights 
Since about 2007, a number of scholars and others have constructed a body of work on the human 
rights dimensions of climate change, in which it is regularly pointed out that climate change may, as a 
side-effect, undermine the grandiose claims that have been made for human rights since World War 
Two (and especially, perhaps, from the 1970s on).
43
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The fact that climate change will have profound human rights consequences seems both strangely 
obvious and curiously irrelevant. After all, much of our human rights machinery has been lying in 
abeyance for decades; indeed, some of it looks as though it was never really intended to function. (I 
am thinking here, of course, of the cumbersomely-named International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), whose compliance mechanisms (principally a review committee) have 
never been regarded as especially effective.)
44
  
Climate change will profoundly exacerbate harms to the set of human rights supposedly protected 
by this treaty – the predictions of increasing hunger, thirst, diseases, and homelessness are, of course, a 
mainstay of climate change discourse,
45
 not to mention the disappearance of entire cultures, islands, 
and with them the traditions of the inhabitants, if not the inhabitants themselves.
46
 However, the 
existing regime is not empowered to deal with this eventuality.
47
 Why not? Because climate change 
harms are not, in the main, caused in the countries where they have worst effects, and, quite aside from 
its general redundancy, the ICESCR has no obvious way of holding extraterritorial actors accountable 
for the harms they cause.
48
 Climate change is already well on the way to joining global poverty as 
something which may have international causes, but does not invoke inter-statal obligations. 
Regrettable, certainly, but sadly difficult to fix. It’s complicated.49 
One might expect that this state of affairs would raise the ire of human rights activists, or incite 
calls for improvement of the human rights regime, or at least add urgency to the climate change 
negotiations. One would be wrong. Climate change discourse has absorbed the human rights challenge 
much as human rights discourse has absorbed the ongoing reality of global poverty – that is, with little 
discernible effect.  
(iii) The Market  
Around about the time Lillebjørn Nilsen was composing ‘Children of the Rainbow’, just across the 
Skagerrak Strait, the nations of the world were gearing up for world’s first environmental conference 
in Stockholm. The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment was largely concerned with the 
theme of environmental (mis)management. Here is the preamble:  
In our time, man's capability to transform his surroundings, if used wisely, can bring to all peoples 
the benefits of development and the opportunity to enhance the quality of life. Wrongly or 
heedlessly applied, the same power can do incalculable harm to human beings and the human 
environment. We see around us growing evidence of man-made harm in many regions of the 
earth.
50
 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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Principles 13, 14 and 15 are concerned with ‘rational planning’ which ‘should be applied to all human 
settlements and urbanization’. According to Principle 13 of the Stockholm Declaration:  
In order to achieve a more rational management of resources and thus to improve the environment, 
States should adopt an integrated and coordinated approach to their development planning so as to 
ensure that development is compatible with the need to protect and improve environment for the 
benefit of their population. 
So far so Keynes. But alongside its technocratic bloodstream, there has also always been, of course, a 
neural strain of outright anti-capitalism running through the ‘environmental movement’, a strain going 
back at least as far as the English Romantics and reaching its peak, it seemed, with the increasingly 
irrefutable evidence of the reality of climate change.
51
 Because climate change posited economic 
growth as itself the problem, it also appeared to hold out the promise of a truly radical politics: 
environmentalism. For environmentalists, what matters is the thing in itself. Biodiversity is to be 
conserved for the sake of our biologically diverse planet, for each individual species, special and 
valuable in its own uniqueness. Climate change is wrong because it damages ‘the environment’ per se, 
it destroys species and ecosystems, which are to be valued, to repeat, in and of themselves. 
Needless to say, the latter sentiment did not make it into the UNFCCC (nor even, for that matter, 
the Convention on Biodiversity
52
). Still, we do find that less radical, more Keynesian language – of 
planning, coordination and redistribution for self-interest – coursing through the Rio treaties. And by 
the 1990s, this too was a language of resistance (or at least of rearguard action). Let’s not forget this 
was the immediate aftermath of the Cold War period and a newer paradigm – today often referred to 
as ‘neoliberal’ – was already coursing through international affairs.53 The UNFCCC seemed to tend in 
quite the reverse direction to this newly dominant neoliberal discourse: the Rio treaties appeared to be 
in part about countering the neoliberal trend; about keeping the ship on course.  
Yet, here too, twenty years on, we find that the real reversal has been back to the 1980s (indeed, to 
the 1880s!). It is not necessary to read Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman to know that ‘planning’ 
per se has long been seen as the bureaucratic problem to which a faith in the market presents the 
apparently irresistible solution.
54
 Today we turn to the markets for all our climate solutions.
55
 This is 
the case even if no-one has explained, to my knowledge, how climate change can be addressed 
without, to paraphrase the Stockholm Declaration, ‘an integrated and coordinated approach to 
[international] development planning’.56 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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The secret is, of course, that it can’t.57 So even as we speak the language of climate change, and 
wring our hands with dismay at the difficulty of reaching agreement and the upward surge of global 
emissions, at the same time that very language is increasingly a repository of diminished expectations 
and attenuated goals, tending ultimately to accommodation with the awful consequences of our 
behavioural excesses.
58
 That, it seems to me, is where we are headed.  
So, I suggest, climate change discourse is primarily a repository of fantasy: it is what we ourselves 
believe is expected of us, what we need to do and say in order to be who we think we are supposed to 
be, in order to succeed, even though we know that, in fact, we are heading towards failure. Deep down 
we know that even if we got what we purportedly want – a functional carbon price, proliferating 
REDD+ projects, and a vibrant global emissions trading regime – we would still fail, at least if by 
success we mean ‘preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate’.59 On those 
terms, the system we are currently investing in is not designed to succeed. 
C. Revelation, Retribution, Redemption 
To conclude, I wish to make a final point about the recent evolution of climate change discourse and 
that is to connect it back to the Christian eschatology that appears to have fallen into desuetude in 
Europe, so much so that the fantasist Breivik apparently felt compelled to defend it. There are 
religious groups, notably in the United States today, who attack climate change along familiar lines of 
a staunch religious faith in the benevolence of God’s will and intention, and in opposition to the 
profanity of a secular science.
60
  
The reverse, however, is closer to the truth: to believe in climate change is much rather a leap of 
faith than to disbelieve. Climate science is, of course, extraordinarily complex. Those of us who 
believe in it rarely understand it fully. Certainly we are versed in the fundamentals; we can recount an 
apparently seamless narrative; and we can (increasingly) point to evidence in support of our claims. 
And yet, if pushed, few of us can vouch for the truth of climate science as a matter of examined 
empirical evidence – we lack the time or training to hold up to scrutiny the vast number of causal 
relationships and observations that, by now, constitute the truth-claim of climate science.  
Were we to do so, we would be following in the footsteps of Descartes, carrying on a respected 
Enlightenment sceptical tradition that ultimately replaced faith in ‘higher authorities’ with the first-
hand evidence of our senses (the same profaning move that, Nietzsche warned us, ultimately killed off 
God).
61
 Instead, however, we must take the claims of science on faith: indeed, as the French 
philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard pointed out long ago, scientific authorities now enjoy the claim on 
our faith that religious authorities have ceded.
62
 Contrariwise, it is climate change denial, today, that 
increasingly appears in the respectable garb of Enlightenment scepticism, unafraid to query the 
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received ideas of the present and to expose the irrationality of a knowledge accepted on the basis of 
the authority of its source.
63
  
But its reliance on faith is not the only debt climate discourse owes to the secularisation of our 
former religious traditions. From the outset, climate change presented an unmissably apocalyptic 
narrative, whose appeal lay partly in its strong overtones of a divine wrath best understood (ironically) 
in the Evangelical Protestant tradition: we will be punished for the ills we have wrought on our planet 
and on our fellow man and animals. What’s more, we deserve it. Revelation then (climate change is 
foretold) and retribution (it is a form of punishment), but also redemption. We can redeem ourselves 
by desisting from our sinful ways and returning to the path of righteousness. Indeed climate change 
discourse began by marrying the radicalism of religious heresy to the enlightened idealism of scientific 
certainty. Hence its tremendous early appeal. And its appearance – in 1988 – could not have been 
better timed to provide a replacement master-narrative for the fading Cold War story.  
Now, however, partly because climate change discourse has been adopted at most centres of 
authority, it can no longer present itself as radical or challenging: today climate change functions 
primarily as discourse; that is, it provides a mechanism that serves fundamentally to restabilise the 
grounding principles of a dominant political economy it is no longer capable of resisting. As such, it 
now has no more chance of success (other than at a discursive level) than other such discourses, such 
as the ‘wars’ on drugs and terror, human rights, or the ‘eradication of poverty’.  
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Children of the Rainbow (Lillebjørn Nilsen, 1973) 
A sky full of stars. 
Blue sea as far as you can see. 
A land where flowers grow. 
Could you want more? 
 
Together we will live 
every sister and every brother. 
Small children of the rainbow 
and a flourishing world. 
My Rainbow Race (Pete Seeger, 1967)
64
 
One blue sky above us 
One ocean lapping all our shore 
One earth so green and round 
Who could ask for more 
 
And because I love you 
I'll give it one more try 
To show my rainbow race 
It's too soon to die. 
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Climate Change, Major Groups and the Importance of a Seat at the Table: Women and 
the UNFCC Negotiations 
Karen Morrow* 
Abstract 
This paper considers the approaches adopted towards developing international environmental law 
rooted in the 1992 UNCED, comparing the typical ‘top-down’ approach to international 
environmental law exhibited in the UNFCCC with the ‘bottom-up’ approach espoused by Agenda 21. 
It will be argued that, while adopting such widely differing approaches was explicable at that time, the 
continuing failure to characterise the climate change regime more coherently within the sustainability 
context has had important ramifications in its development. Not least, the initial narrow state-centric 
and technocratic approach taken towards climate change excluded the voices of important stakeholders 
from the debate shaping the international law regime, an issue that has been one of the less discussed 
factors impeding legal progress in this area.  
The paper considers the position of women as an example of a stakeholder/major group that has, 
until very recently, been both accorded privileged participant status in the international sustainable 
development context and yet overlooked in the climate change regime. It will examine the impact of 
activist and theoretical ecofeminism in prompting and shaping women’s engagement with the 
international polis in these areas and practical reasons for according broad participation rights to 
women (and by implication, given the inclusive approach taken by ecofeminism, to other stakeholder 
groups) in these contexts. It will look at how women’s participation has developed in sustainable 
development and climate change contexts and consider the ramifications of this including: benefits of 
and barriers to wider participation in the climate change regime and how the latter could be addressed. 
Introduction: International Environmental Law and the UNCED 1992 – Sowing the 
seeds of a revolution? 
This paper considers the intersections between ecofeminism and sustainability and the mechanisms 
that seek to address them (notably rights and gender mainstreaming) in the contexts of Agenda 21
1
 and 
the UNFCCC climate change which will, for these purposes, be viewed in the guise of a sustainability 
issue.  
Early commentary on the first Rio Earth Summit presented sustainable development as the 
UNCED’s most revolutionary output. Indeed the apparent ambition of the now commonplace 
Brundtland conception of: ‘...development which meets the needs of the present generation without 
jeopardizing the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’2 was enormous, if with the 
benefit of hindsight, overweening. In reality, while it was open to a variety of potential interpretations, 
in operational terms its ambit has been determined by the fact that, insofar as its primary target 
audience, States, was concerned, it offered no real threat to their ability to conduct ‘business as usual’. 
Its appeal lay in the promotion of what was presented as an apparently straightforward balancing of 
social, economic and environmental concerns, essentially allowing sustainable development to operate 
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without fundamentally challenging the dominance of capitalist economics.
3
 As attaining broad State 
support was of course necessary to breathe life into the concept of sustainable development in 
international law, this type of lowest common denominator approach was explicable, but in 
consequence it is hardly surprising that sustainable development praxis to date is far from being the 
‘game changer’ required to tackle anthropogenic environmental degradation. 
That said, if sustainable development has proved disappointing in tackling environmental 
degradation and its attendant social ills, there are a number of ways in which it has begun to alter the 
way in which the business of international environmental law is done that may ultimately better equip 
humanity to face the multi-faceted challenges posed by global-scale existential threats. Arguably the 
most important of these lies in its re-fashioning of the international polis, extending its direct reach 
well beyond traditional state actors and giving non-state actors, in particular in the guise of major 
groups, a more pronounced, broad and consistent role
4
 than had been the case in international law 
hithertofore. The reason for this development lies not in any altruism on the part of states, rather it is 
prompted by the unique nature of sustainable development as a concept which, as acknowledged in the 
Brundtland Report’s methodology and eventual approach,5 is as dependant on grassroots buy-in and 
bottom up action as it is on statecraft. Thus, from the outset, advancing sustainability has been 
understood as requiring not only the engagement of states that is the traditional province of 
international law, but also the active involvement of civil society. By signing up to the UN’s 
‘blueprint’ for sustainable development, Agenda 21,6 states were effectively ‘buying in’ to this 
approach, though perhaps not fully taking on board its implications at the time.  
At its most fundamental level, the bottom up view of sustainability necessitates engagement with 
individuals, which is necessarily and normally mediated through the representative function of civil 
society as stakeholders in an international law context. In the sustainability context this has been 
highly formalised and institutionalised through facilitating the participation of a number of recognised 
‘major groups’. The willingness and ability of civil society to engage with the sustainability agenda 
plays an important (though far from straightforward
7
) role in both principle and practice in translating 
the global to the local and vice versa. In this regard fostering engagement with civil society, as 
undertaken by the Rio-mandated Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD), is instrumental in 
both the attempt to advance sustainability and achieve its societal mainstreaming. This strategy 
recognises that civil society actors undertake multifarious roles: as communicators, educators, opinion 
formers and facilitators. In so doing civil society ideally serves and expresses the views of grass-roots 
constituencies, acting to some extent as a conduit for their two-way engagement with states and 
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) to provide impetus to the developing sustainability agenda.  
Thus it can be argued that, for all of its limitations, this approach to sustainability did indeed sow 
what may well prove to be, in the words of the poet Simon Armitage: ‘The seeds of the world for the 
world after this’,8 by laying down one of the foundations for innovative modes of expanded societal 
engagement in international environmental law and policy. This is a necessary response to the ‘new 
world’ that we now seem set on an inexorable course toward; one that is now recognised in a way that 
was not the case in 1992, as being significantly shaped by a compromised global climate system. 
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Ecofeminism – a (very) brief introduction 
The concepts of personal agency and civil society activism that underpin bottom up approaches to 
sustainability intersect to a degree with the principles and priorities of ecofeminism. We can see this 
expressed in concrete terms in the context of Agenda 21. First though we will look briefly at the 
concept of ecofeminism. 
As its name suggests, ecofeminism is ultimately the progeny of both ecological/environmental and 
feminist ideologies and now contributes to each of these areas of social inquiry and beyond. That said, 
ecofeminism enjoys a degree of hybrid vigour and has not been limited in its development to 
synthesising its conceptual inheritance, but has arguably developed beyond this into a rich (if 
contentious) area of discourse in its own right. It has made its impact felt in, for example, such diverse 
fields as sociology, ecology and philosophy and it is latterly beginning to generate significant impacts 
in the context of international environmental law and policy.  
It was inevitable that feminism would turn its gaze on environmental affairs as these became a 
prominent issue of societal concern.
9
 The application of feminist scrutiny to the multiplicity of impacts 
of environmental degradation prompted the development of ecofeminism, the term itself being first 
used by Francois d’Eaubonne10 in 1974 and passing into wider usage soon after. The 1960s also saw 
an escalation in the development of human ecology, the branch of the broader discipline focused on 
human/ecosystem interaction, which subsequently came to accommodate gender-based perspectives as 
part of its own expansive scholarly agenda.
11
  
In the simplest terms, ecofeminism focuses on the shared approaches toward women and nature 
that are founded on the application to post-Enlightenment dualism to each of them. This involved the 
construction of both women and nature in terms of being ‘other’ to the male and rational, resulting in 
them being deemed inferior and therefore ripe for exploitation. One consequence of the social praxis 
that resulted was the conception of the notion of ‘disadvantage’ that applied to them as a result.12  
Much of the early development of ecofeminism thought and theory took place in the US and was 
rooted, not as one might expect, in environmental activism, but rather in spiritual/theological and 
artistic (notably poetic) inquiry.
13
 As a result, in its initial incarnation, ecofeminism was rather 
narrowly focussed. Nonetheless, it developed broadly and rapidly as a result what has come to be 
identified as of one of its core characteristics – from the outset ecofeminism was as much concerned 
with practice as with theory. In consequence it came to accommodate an extensive range issues 
through developing broader conceptualisations of the intersections between gender and environmental 
concerns. One particularly significant development for present purposes, embracing grassroots 
activism from the developing world, and also theorising it, was soon made manifest in ecofeminist 
contributions to the contentious law and development debate.
14
 In this arena, ecofeminist approaches 
demonstrated connections between the feminisation of poverty and environmental degradation as 
intimately interconnected consequences of the export of the dominant western-capitalism-oriented 
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development paradigm to the developing world.
15
 This saw poverty, pollution and unsustainable 
resource exploitation excluded from the indicators of (mal)development
16
 and characterised in effect 
as mere externalities in the prevailing economic model, resulting in them being largely ignored in 
political practice and excluded from the province of legal concern.  
Over time, ecofeminism has seen the development of a number of distinct strands. For the sake of 
brevity (and indeed manageability), as ecofeminism is an inherently inclusive and malleable concept 
which manifests itself in myriad forms, the resulting spectrum can be broadly represented as falling 
between essentialist and social ecofeminisms. At one end of the range, essentialist perspectives are 
founded on views of biology and/or spirituality
17
 that result in women supposedly exhibiting a 
stronger identification with the environment than men; obviously this is a controversial position. 
Social ecofeminist approaches on the other hand are based on the much less contested premise that a 
special relationship exists between women and the environment due in part to women’s reproductive 
functions, as broadly understood, extending beyond procreation to include the full range of activities 
necessary to sustain life, which fall to their lot (albeit to varying degrees) in many parts of the world. 
Social ecofeminist theories also view the sphere of the ‘personal’ as extending into the surrounding 
world and reflect the complex interrelating influences that situate women in a variety of ways – most 
significantly race/ethnicity, class and age, as expressed through the recognition of a compound 
conception of disadvantage. Thus social ecofeminist approaches view the relationships between 
women and the environment as socially rooted and enforced/reinforced by a complex interlinked web 
of societal mechanisms. In this view, it is recognised that women feature prominently amongst those 
subjected to the greatest burden by all classes of environmental degradation, but at the same time they 
are also identified as potentially powerful agents of change in tackling them. 
In sum, ecofeminism, for all of its diversity, is perhaps best viewed as attempting to articulate those 
areas of human/environment relationships that are particularly relevant to women, providing a 
necessary corrective to the dominant patriarchal world view and the structures that it inhabits.
18
On this 
view, the relationship between women and the environment is, in part, biologically determined, in that 
the whole of humanity is part of and depends upon the biosphere for life itself and for its subsistence. 
This dependence of course manifests itself fundamentally for each of us, but our experience and 
appreciation of it is highly variable and dependant on a host of more or less obvious societal factors 
ranging from geography and economics through culture, politics and law and the various intersections 
between them. Each of these components raises gender-specific considerations and thus ecofeminism 
insists that gender is a cross-cutting issue that inevitably touches on all aspects of our being and 
agency.  
Core ecofeminist concerns encapsulate a number of strategies for tackling dualism and its 
implications. For example, ecofeminists view viable decision-making processes as needing to 
accommodate gender (female and male) perspectives and the concerns of nature, is so doing stressing 
difference but also equality and these initial foci remain foundational. Areas identified as appropriate 
for ecofeminist concern have however expanded beyond gender to include multiple 
disadvantage/oppressions, notably race (embracing the concerns of people of colour and indigenous 
peoples), class, sexual orientation, and non-human nature and this approach to equally apply to other 
factors such as age and disability.  
                                                     
15
 Ibid, 77. 
16
 Ibid, 74. 
17
 L. Marina: ‘Woman & the Land’ (2002) www.ecofem,org/journal at http://www.lancs.ac.uk/staff/twine/ecofem/linda.pdf 
(last accessed 28/06/2010). 
18
 Merchant, n 13. 
Climate Change, Major Groups and the Importance of a Seat at the Table: Women and the UNFCC Negotiations 
23 
Strategies, Techniques and Approaches 
Ecofeminism advocates and embraces a number of strategies, techniques and approaches
19
 to advance 
the societal transformation that it seeks in addressing these multiple, intertwined oppressions. While 
agenda setting may be the ultimate goal, for a relatively disempowered group, this can be problematic 
and more incremental approaches therefore tend to predominate. Central to ecofeminist approaches to 
policy and decision-making is the promotion of inclusiveness through adopting open, inclusive and 
participatory decision-making. In light of this, ecofeminism, in response to its activist roots, accords 
respect to lived experience in decision-making – not to the exclusion of scientific/technical concerns, 
but as an important source of relevant material in its own right, ensuring that the decisions arrived at 
are based on the most complete information possible.  
In pursing the participation agenda, ecofeminist activism feature skills and well-worn approaches 
gleaned from women’s long, (pro)active civil society engagement in both domestic and international 
arenas,
20
 notably: focussed campaigning; broader consensus building activities; general network and 
specific coalition construction around matters of shared concern; and sharing skill sets. These occur 
both within the women’s movement but also in reaching out to other civil society actors, utilising 
traditional means and enthusiastically harnessing new technologies. Pressing forward on participation 
strategies are useful up to a point to critique systems from which women are excluded but to be fully 
realised they need to be harnessed to winning substantive participation rights (and as we shall see 
when we look at the UNFCCC these are by no means guaranteed), the impact of which falls ultimately 
be evaluated in qualitative terms. It is not sufficient to allow participants to feed into processes; in 
order to be meaningful participation must secure proportionate influence on outcomes. Even where 
participation rights are accorded, this is not the end of the story as their exercise may be hampered by 
a host of factors, structural and procedural, including: lack of resources to facilitate participation; lack 
of representation; lack of access to information; lack of technical capacity to engage with scientific 
materials; limited advocacy skills; financial and procedural barriers to litigation etc. Women 
experience an additional range of gendered social, economic, cultural, legal and educational barriers 
that serve to make their participation particularly problematic.
21
 The problems encountered with 
participation can only be amplified by the additional complexities that arise where gender and 
sustainability overlap.  
Even if problems with participation are ostensibly addressed, tokenism is always a danger: where 
the public is allowed (or even encouraged) to participate in decision-making processes, such 
entitlements are rendered moot if they do not deliver commensurate influence. In order to attempt to 
address these issues where gender is concerned, latterly feminist approaches have extended to 
advocating the adoption of ambitious gender mainstreaming strategies, a product of the ‘third wave’ of 
political and technical initiatives
22
 which attempt to address gendered policy concerns in a holistic 
way. It may be defined as:  
… the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including 
legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making 
women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic 
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and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The 
ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.
23
 
In practical terms mainstreaming approaches comprise internal mechanical organisational change and 
at the same time seek a more profound enculturation of gender at an institutional and societal level. 
For gender mainstreaming to succeed, both attitudes and practices need to change. While attempts to 
generate changes in institutional culture of this kind are usually the province of specific initiatives, 
concrete changes in practice may also, as a by-product of their primary purpose, simultaneously serve 
to bring about changes in institutional values that are one characteristic of culture change.  
Ambitious as it is, gender mainstreaming does have limitations. In the first place, innovative as it is 
in many ways, it is less radical than agenda-setting, involving the integration of gender considerations 
into existing policy areas rather than requiring or constituting a full-scale re-orientation of policy 
agendas.
24
 Furthermore gender mainstreaming does not, in and of itself, actually overcome the impacts 
of pre-existing power differentials.
25
 While it does potentially open policy and decision-making 
processes to women as a hitherto a disadvantaged and/or excluded group, its actual impact is 
dependent on the extent to which it is embraced by policy and decision-makers. Thus at each end of 
the scale, mere lip-service to gender mainstreaming will deliver little, but fully taking what it has to 
offer on board is potentially revolutionary. However, organisational cooperation is not necessarily 
guaranteed in gender mainstreaming endeavours and any potential for constructive dialogue, let alone 
action, can be fatally compromised by wildly differing interpretations of key concepts once analysis 
passes beyond the superficial.
26
 In addition, while it is often characterised as a ‘dual agenda’ (or ‘win 
win’) concept, gender mainstreaming can, as with other cross-cutting agendas, be perceived as a threat 
to a multiplicity of entrenched institutional values and practices, conflicting with established 
mainstream policy goals. 
Two Contrasting Approaches Rooted in the UNCED 1992: Women, Agenda 21 and the 
UNFCCC 
In considering its multifaceted emphasis on participation, ecofeminism can be presented as promoting 
a conception of a broader feminist conception of engaged citizenship,
 27
 both individual and collective, 
that potentially sits rather well with the bottom-up stakeholder approaches that are a feature of 
sustainability rhetoric, an observation that appears to be borne out by the role played by women in the 
development of Agenda 21. Extending like understanding to climate change, arguably the most 
pressing of the many challenges to human sustainability at present, would seem to be inevitable, as it 
too is underpinned by an understanding of the location of humans within an inescapable (though 
mutable for good and ill) ecological context and the necessary constraints that these place on 
individual and collective human activity. That said, political factors and the shape that they have given 
to international environmental law in this area has, as will be shown below, meant that even beginning 
to bow to this inevitability has been a long, drawn out and painful process.  
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Sustainability, Agenda 21 and Gender 
The prominent role forged by women in Agenda 21 did not come out of the ether – the UN by this 
stage had already gained considerable experience of engaging with the complex cross-cutting issues 
raised by gender. Broadly speaking, the UN’s approach to gender prior to 1992 had been a top-down 
process (albeit an innovative one that was highly responsive to grassroots input), with 
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) institutions and states taking the lead in fostering first the 
inclusion, then the prioritisation and ultimately the mainstreaming agenda in the search for more 
effective policies and programmes.
28
 Sustainable development, as alluded to above, is however a 
rather different proposition, for while it is promoted and facilitated by IGOs and states in a similar 
fashion to engagement with gender issues, at the same time, just as importantly, it is explicitly 
predicated on grass-roots involvement. Thus sustainable development with its expansive socio-
political, economic and environmental grounding demands the adoption of a broad approach to the 
relationship between humanity and the environment in order to fundamentally re-fashion it. This 
inevitably requires engagement with societal complexity in its multifarious forms and this necessitates 
re-envisioning the global polis and its governance, in order to harness bottom-up/grassroots activity to 
established top-down political processes in an unprecedented manner.
29
 Key mechanisms in 
facilitating the radical degree of engagement that such wholesale change requires included nurturing 
and developing the role of civil society, a central element in the UNCED’s blueprint for change - 
Agenda 21
30
 and the ongoing work of the UN’s Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD). The 
latter was charged with fostering the ongoing sustainability agenda and in so doing it actively 
cultivated the ‘major groups’ identified in Agenda 21 as instrumental in forging and taking forward 
developing the sustainability agenda. Women were numbered among these major groups, undoubtedly 
a significant development in principle, but not a surprise. The women’s movement was already a well-
established actor within UN system by this time and had gained considerable experience in engaging 
with international policy and law agendas as a result. Furthermore, and this was to prove particularly 
valuable in the sustainability context, the women’s movement drew support and influence from an 
established global grassroots network. These factors combined to see the women’s movement 
excellently positioned to push its priorities to the fore in the sustainability context. This is exemplified 
in the development of Agenda 21 itself.  
By the time of the UNCED process, in addition to their international profile on gender matters, 
women already played an established role in the rank and file of grassroots environmental 
organisations and (to some degree) their leadership
31
 and enjoyed both considerable expertise and 
wide networks of contacts as a result. This meant that they well relatively well positioned to exploit 
the opportunities offered by the need to inculcate bottom up participation in the sustainability agenda 
in the run-up to the UNCED. The highest profile initiative in this period was taken by a leading 
women’s environmental NGO, the Women’s Environment and Development Organisation (WEDO)32. 
It set up the World Women’s Congress for a Healthy Planet in Miami in 1991, which involved a 
practical demonstration of several traits the feature in the core values and strategies of ecofeminism. 
Thus WEDO built on and developed existing women’s networks to ensure that the broad spectrum of 
women’s opinion from the developed and the developing world was represented at the Congress in an 
open and inclusive participatory process. The Congress proved a significant milestone in both the 
praxis of ecofeminism and in strengthening the platform for women’s engagement with international 
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environmental law and policy. In concrete terms it produced its own Women’s Action Agenda 21,33 
which in turn influenced redrafting of the original supposedly ‘gender neutral’ text of Agenda 21, 
integrating gender issues throughout, which remain in the document as finally agreed at the UNCED 
itself.
34
  
The women’s movement’s position in the sustainability context, notably under the auspices of the 
CSD has been augmented by the potent coincidence of priorities enjoyed by this strand of 
sustainability opinion-making activity and the broader gender mainstreaming agenda espoused by the 
UN and its institutions. Having said this, it is also the case that major groups must be viewed as part of 
a whole, and not simply in isolation from one another in the broader sustainability context and women 
necessarily fall into each of the other major groups in addition to that constructed by their gender. 
Ecofeminism accommodates this in its recognition of and readiness to accommodate the complex and 
multi-faceted real-world identities of women through compound conceptions of disadvantage.  
The recognition of the intersection of sustainability with gender that flavours Agenda 21 is an 
important development but should not be allowed to mask the fact that they each raise complex issues 
in their own right and that the intricacies involved are necessarily aggravated when these already 
composite fields overlap. Engaging effectively with such intersections is challenging, to say the least 
but it is beginning to happen, for example in the OECD
35
 which has done some ground-breaking work 
in examining its own internal sustainability agenda both as part of its institutional ‘housekeeping’ and 
in its contribution to the work of the CSD.
36
 The OECD is attempting to tackle hybrid issues in this 
area by ‘engendering’ its analytical, statistical and policy work,37 with the aim of garnering qualitative 
improvement in its adopted policies and actively fostering sustainability. While predominantly 
focussed on practical matters, it also points to deeper problems of inbuilt and pervasive institutional 
gender bias, generated by and expressed in the deepest assumptions and practices that underpin 
modern society’s substructure. Significantly, the need to secure the effective exercise of rights in 
general and political and legal participation rights (key ecofeminist concerns) in particular, are 
identified as being of particular concern and as requiring conscious institutional engagement and 
action.  
The UN, Climate Change and Gender 
In contrast to the innovative stance taken with sustainable development, the international community’s 
approach to climate change, at the UNCED in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC)
38
 invoked a typical state-centric multilateral environmental agreement. This was 
perhaps explicable given the highly technical nature of what was still very much emerging science at 
that time and its controversial and contested status. It could also perhaps be ascribed to a general 
failure to fully appreciate the extraordinary ramifications of climate change, of which more below. In 
any event, the adoption of a framework convention at the Rio conference enabled the UN to avoid 
having to include inevitably contentious substantive emission reduction targets in the document 
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itself.
39
 These had to wait for the Kyoto Protocol to the Convention in 1998,
40
 and, hard won as they 
were, their patent inadequacy in light IPCC’s scientific opinion on what was actually required to 
address climate change, was the subject of trenchant criticism from the outset.
41
 Ongoing attempts to 
hammer out a successor to the Kyoto Protocol have proved even more fraught as the process founders 
on the rocks of the entrenched North/South
42
 positions adopted on the core issues.  
In addition to the substantive shortcomings of the climate change regime, it seems also to have 
suffered from a crippling lack of vision from the outset. In common with gender and sustainability, 
climate change is a complex and cross-cutting issue made manifest in a variety of areas and on a vast 
scale. It raises issues in its own right but it is also interwoven with other major issues which are also 
problematic in themselves, including, but not confined to: health; resource scarcity; food security, 
environmental disasters, conflict and migration and of course the aforementioned gender and 
sustainability concerns. When these issues conjoin, the complexities involved are inevitably 
compounded and the search for solutions becomes correspondingly problematised and arguably 
requires greater creativity than has been demonstrated hithertofore. One manifestation of such 
creativity would involve viewing climate change not only as a traditional international environmental 
law issue but also as a sustainability issue, based on the understanding that it requires not only state 
engagement but also action by individuals in order to generate the behavioural change that is 
necessary to respond to the altered social, economic and environmental realities that it involves. Given 
the scope and pervasive nature of climate change issues, it would seem logical to suggest that a 
synthesis of the top-down and bottom up approaches discussed, in particular through the organised and 
active agency of NGOs, offers the most viable mechanism to improve and extend the range of 
responses to this core aspect of participation problems. This would mandate the adoption of an open, 
inclusive stakeholder type of approach, underpinned by a mainstreaming component, to correct inbuilt 
institutional bias that excludes many cogent voices from the law and policy debate thus enriching it 
through inclusivity.  
As anthropogenic climate change has progressed from hotly contested theory into something 
approaching broadly accepted orthodoxy, the fact that it is having and will continue to have a 
disproportionate impact on the most vulnerable in society (of which women form the majority
43
) has 
become increasingly recognised.
44
 Due to wide-ranging and deep-set societal inequalities, women 
stand among both the most disadvantaged in practical terms by the impacts of climate change and the 
least well placed socially, legally and economically to resist and/or address and adapt to them.
45
 In 
light of this, women’s specific priorities in climate change have been identified as: mitigation; 
adaptation; sustainability, participation and realising the Millennium Development Goals.
46
 
Furthermore, women through the operation of double or compound disadvantage are also among the 
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most adversely affected members within other disadvantaged categories, notably indigenous peoples 
and refugees.
47
 However, viewing women as victims of climate change provides only a partial and 
therefore inaccurate picture; women are also drivers of and contribute to the societal practices that 
generate climate change. At the same time, through gendered societal roles and responsibilities, 
women are holders of considerable (though often latent/under-exploited) capacity to offer practical 
insights into addressing environmental problems and are therefore also potentially powerful agents for 
change. Thus participation for women in the climate change context is not only important in principle, 
but also in practice, as women have significant contributions to make to the climate change debate in 
general and in particular on the ‘sharp-end’ issues of adaptation to and mitigation of climate change.48 
To this end, and given the now moribund state-centric UNFCCC process,
49
 it would seem at least 
prudent to consider what we have already learned about better engaging with complex cross-cutting 
issues from experience in the other areas, such as where gender and sustainability intersect. As 
indicated above, while the sustainability agenda is promoted and facilitated by IGOs and states it is, 
just as importantly, also explicitly predicated on grass-roots involvement. Therefore civil society buy-
in, not least that of the major groups, (including women) plays a crucial, if not unproblematic role in 
translating and mediating the global to the local and vice versa. In this regard the role of civil society 
is instrumental in both the attempt to engage sustainability and the societal mainstream (in acting as 
educators, opinion formers and facilitators serving and expressing the views of their communities) and 
also in looking upward and outward, engaging with states and IGOs to provide impetus to the agenda. 
Given the paucity of progress in the international law of climate change
50
 in recent years, the theory 
and practice of sustainability shows that there are potential synergies to be exploited in such complex 
debates that it would be wise to consider exploiting in order to reinvigorate this sphere. 
In light of the current glacial rate of progress, it is unsurprising that many parts of the UN (though 
notably not until very recently the UNFCCC regime itself) have recognised the significance of giving 
women a voice in the climate change context and have dedicated resources to capacity building in 
order to facilitate their engagement. Important contributions have been made by the Commission on 
the Status of Women, which has stated in an issues paper that: ‘Women tend ... to be underrepresented 
in decision-making on sustainable development, including climate change, and this impeded their 
ability to contribute their unique and valuable perspective and expertise on climate change.’51 The 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) too has 
taken a position on climate change, setting up a committee to address its links with gender, and 
drawing attention to the ‘absence of a gender perspective’ in the UNFCCC and the consequent need to 
address the manifold issues that this raises, including gender mainstreaming and participation.
52
 
Recognition of the links between the gender issue and climate change within the UN system also 
extends beyond its specifically gender-oriented elements, thus the UN Development Programme has 
been active in this area, notably in adopting a comprehensive Resource Guide on Gender and Climate 
                                                     
47
 Brody el al. n22. 
48
 Ibid. 
49
 See, for coverage of the very limited progress made of late, See E. Burleson, ‘Climate Change Consensus: Emerging 
International Law’, 34 William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 543 (2010).  
50
 See, for example, Bond, n43. 
51
 CSW: ‘Gender Perspectives on Climate Change’, 52nd session of the Commission on the Status of Women, 2008 at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/csw52/issuespapers/Gender%20and%20climate%20change%20paper%20final.
pdf (last accessed 30/06/2010). 
52
 CEDAW: ‘Statement of the CEDAW Committee on Gender and Climate Change’ (adopted at the 44th session of 
CEDAW 20 July to 7 August, New York 2009) at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/Gender_and_climate_change.pdf (last accessed 30/06/2009). 
Climate Change, Major Groups and the Importance of a Seat at the Table: Women and the UNFCC Negotiations 
29 
Change.
53
 This document underlines the paucity of women’s participation in the climate change arena, 
noting that: ‘There can be no effective and efficient battle against climate change if there is not 
equitable representation of all segments of society in decision-making at all levels.’54 The Resource 
Guide seeks to support and facilitate change by providing guidelines for action for actors, practitioners 
and consumers, promoting the development of a more integrated and proactive policy agenda in the 
gender/climate change arena. The World Conservation Union (IUCN) has also given specific 
consideration to these issues.
55
 
In marked contrast to these developments, progress in tackling gender matters within the main 
UNFCCC regime has been comparatively limited. The reasons for this are several and complex. First, 
until very recently, the institutional actors have not been moved to engage pro-actively engage with 
the women’s movement, though interestingly they had reached out to many of the other Agenda 21 
major groups, specifically, Environmental, Business and Industry NGOs; Local Government and 
Municipal Authorities; Indigenous Peoples; and Research and Independent Organisations and Trade 
Union NGOs.
56
 This could be taken as indicating that the UNFCCC itself was already recognising that 
a traditional international environmental law state-centric and technocratic approach was insufficient – 
though the choice of stakeholder groups with which to engage speaks volumes on its failure to 
appreciate the significance of gender to its activities.  
In fairness, it could be said that the state-centric, technocratic form taken by the climate change 
negotiations at Rio left scant opportunity for women to engage with the process. Though the need to 
pursue gender issues in the climate change regime became apparent fairly early on, it took some time 
for the women’s movement to build up the necessary momentum to do so and a failed early attempt to 
initiate a women’s NGO forum at the first FCCC Conference of Parties (COP1) in 199557 left the issue 
in the wasteland for a number of years. Interest was eventually rekindled by discussion of gender 
issues more generally in the run up to the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 
2002.
58
 The work of the CSD on energy and sustainable development prior to the WSSD specifically 
demonstrated the need for a multi-pronged attack on the gender/climate change issue, as it revealed 
this as an area in which women as a major group exercised little effective influence. This development 
in turn prompted the G77 to raise gender as a concern in the FCCC process. Thus at FCCC COP7 in 
2001 a draft resolution was finally adopted advocating improved representation for women among 
participants. However, the first women’s parallel caucus in the FCCC process was not held until COP 
11 in 2005, though it did prove crucial in sparking the momentum required to further advance gender 
concerns in the climate change context, prompting more consistent practice and prolonged pressure to 
these ends in its wake. Thereafter, the debate developed relatively quickly and discussion on applying 
for constituency status for women emerged at COP13 (Bali) in 2007 and with agreement being 
reached on pursuing this course at COP 14 in 2008.
 
Gaining constituency status augments the position 
of those groups to whom it is accorded in general terms and also allows them to access various 
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intervention rights in the UNFCCC process. A successful application for such status depends on the 
putative constituency’s membership being able to demonstrate that it can make a sustained and 
significant contribution to UNFCCC activities. The application process for the women/gender 
grouping was led by Gendercc – Women for Climate Justice,59 a global network of women, gender 
activists and experts representing all world regions, with specific expertise on gender and climate 
justice issues. The stated goal of the women/gender grouping in seeking constituency status clearly 
identifies its agenda as being: 
... to formalise the voice of the women’s and gender civil society organisations present and 
regularly active in UNFCCC processes, and to debate, streamline and strengthen the positions 
which these organisations put forth. The Constituency draws upon global commitments to gender 
equality and women’s rights, especially as they relate to climate change, and toward the 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and related commitments and Conventions. 
The Constituency works to ensure human rights and a gender perspective is incorporated into 
UNFCCC negotiations, plans and actions.
60
  
In building its case for constituency status, the women/gender grouping employed a number of 
strategies that fit with those identified above as characterising an ecofeminist approach. Notable 
among these was the collaborative negotiation and drafting of the Charter of the Women’s and Gender 
Constituency under the UNFCCC
61
 by a global coalition of women’s groups comprised of: Women in 
Europe for a Common Future (WECF);
62
 ENERGIA (International Network on Gender and 
Sustainable Energy);
63
 WEDO and Gendercc. The Charter expresses commitment to a number of the 
core ecofeminist principles outlined above, specifically: democratic and participatory governance; 
respect for divergent positions; broad, equitable and representative membership by age, region, ability 
and affiliation; and inclusive and enabling procedures (notably utilising electronic communications).
64
 
The Charter’s objectives also fit an ecofeminist agenda, as they include: making women’s voices and 
experiences heard; feeding women’s views into ongoing discourse; and co-operation with other 
constituencies and caucuses,
65 
thereby addressing gender and other oppressions through finding 
‘common ground’. 
The FCCC secretariat approved the women/gender grouping’s application for provisional 
constituency status in 2009. COP16 in 2010, while disappointing in substantive terms, did see a degree 
of progress on gender issues, notably exhibiting greatly improved visibility for them in the conference 
outcomes.
66
 COP16 also saw determined promotion of a rights-based approach to participation by the 
women/gender constituency.
67
 The women/gender movement did not however confine its efforts to 
gain a voice in the FCCC regime to these rights arguments, and significant parallel developments 
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emerged to go beyond this in pressing a leadership role for women in respect of climate justice.
68
 This 
initiative was pursued through the establishment of an informal women’s leadership network, which 
drew together representatives from the UN, governments, civil society, philanthropy and the private 
sector, under the auspices of the Mary Robinson Foundation’s Climate Justice Initiative (MRFCJ), in 
the run-up to COP16. The approach the emerged from the MRFCJ process also exhibits ecofeminist 
characteristics,
69
 notably in advocating: gender equality in FCCC sub-programmes; full participation 
for women in decision-making; collaborative sharing and extrapolation of good practice; and 
networking. Further progress on developing women’s leadership at COP16 was made by establishing a 
troika
70
 consisting of the three female ministers holding the relevant portfolios from the states hosting 
COP 15, 16 and 17, in order play an additional role in promoting the women’s agenda at COP17.  
Full constituency status was finally granted to the women/gender constituency just in time for 
COP17 in 2011, allowing women official observer status in the negotiations.
71
Thus women, 
admittedly late in the day, joined other recognised civil society groupings in this area though it 
beggars belief that it took fifteen years to reach this point in a UN process where an ostensible 
institutional commitment to gender mainstreaming should make their involvement a given priority 
rather than a seeming afterthought. Hard won though the battle for constituency status was, it 
represents only one step, albeit an important one, along the road to effective participation for women 
in the FCCC regime. In light of this the Charter of the Women’s and Gender Constituency under the 
UNFCCC identified ‘Fostering the wide participation of women and women’s issues in these 
processes and supporting their views and perspectives’72 as a key consideration in the ongoing work of 
the women/gender constituency. Realising effective participation requires that policies, procedures and 
processes are put in place that are capable of addressing women’s general lack of power in respect of 
both policy and decision-making processes.
73
 Failure to adequately address these structural problems 
acts not only to the detriment of women’s exercise and enjoyment of the rights of equal citizenship but 
also goes to the viability of societal responses to the substantive issues themselves. A number of 
factors have been identified which specifically affect both the sustainability and the effectiveness of 
women’s participation in climate change governance. Law plays a specific role in this regard through: 
raising awareness of rights and how to access them and providing rights of access to both general and 
specific legal and policy information.
74
  
Rio+20, Gender and Climate Change  
While the UNFCCC regime had, by 2011, finally come to accommodate gender and women’s 
participation in the climate change negotiation process, these issues also fell to be considered in the 
more general forum provided by the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development 
(UNCSD) 2012, the Rio+20 Conference. The Rio+20 process, rather than producing a new legal 
agreement, in the end confined itself to issuing a non-binding outcome document entitled ‘The Future 
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We Want’ (TFWW),75 that, for the most part, reiterated the commitments made at the original Rio 
summit in 1992. While the fact that the run-up to Rio+20 arguably saw even the limited UNCED 
legacy under threat
76
 made it useful to underline areas agreed upon two decades before, given the 
signal lack of progress in most areas of environmental concern in the interim and the mounting matrix 
of environmental crises, much more was needed.
77
  
On the gender front, UN Women,
78
 the UN’s Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of 
Women which was (significantly from the point of view of adding coherence to gender issues within 
the UN system) constituted in 2010, had a very visible presence at Rio+20. Its activities included co-
hosting a high level meeting, entitled ‘The Future Women Want’ for female heads of states where a 
call to action on integrating gender equality and women’s empowerment in all sustainable 
development frameworks was signed. This was supported by a suite of concrete policy 
recommendations.
79
 In addition to its broader aspiration to secure culture change on gender
80
 UN 
Women set itself three specific goals for the summit. These were to ensure that: ‘… all international 
agreements reference the key role of women in achieving sustainable development; women at 
grassroots level participate in future international talks and conferences; and gender equality is fully 
integrated into any new mechanisms to measure sustainable development’. 81 Women’s civil society 
groups too were very palpably present in Rio, working with the avowed aim of ensuring that women’s 
issues were ‘firmly embedded’ in the summit’s outcomes. 82 Nonetheless, despite the efforts of those 
promoting the women/gender cause, TFWW offers somewhat mixed coverage of gender issues – 
while it contains a considerable quantity of coverage for these issues, but the quality of that coverage 
is open to question. At the outset, the international community’s agreed ‘common vision’ as expressed 
in TFWW reaffirmed: ‘...the importance of ... gender equality and women’s empowerment’.83 Gender 
also featured in the symbolically important section of the document dedicated to ‘Renewing Political 
Commitment’ which stated that: 
‘... We recognize that gender equality and women’s empowerment are important for sustainable 
development and our common future. We reaffirm our commitments to ensure women’s equal 
rights, access and opportunities for participation and leadership in the economy, society and 
political decision making.’
84
 
The specific emphasis on rights, participation and leadership in a gendered context that features here 
chimes well with the earlier coverage given to these issues in the realm of sustainability, considered 
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above, and perhaps speaks also, alongside developments such as those that have occurred of late in the 
FCCC regime, to a degree of mainstreaming of gender issues in the culture of international 
environmental law.  
While the coverage given to gender in TFWW was criticised by some as ‘vague’ (this accusation 
could actually be levelled at much of the content of the document);
85
 gender did at least receive quite 
prominent and indeed pervasive coverage in its own right in the ‘Framework for Action and Follow-
up’ section of TFWW which treated it as a thematic/cross-sectoral issue. Further references were made 
at this point to participation and leadership and to women’s only partially realised potential in this 
regard
86
 and a decision was recorded to ‘accelerate the implementation’ of existing commitments in 
CEDAW, Agenda 21, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the Millennium 
Declaration.
87
 While this all sounds very well, like much of the rest of TFWW, it does not involve 
anything new, but rather points to the need to address failures to give effect to already often long 
extant commitments.  
Resolutions are also recorded in TFWW to help to create an environment conducive to women’s 
participation in sustainability governance, including: repealing discriminatory laws; promoting equal 
access to justice and legal support; and undertaking institutional reform: ‘... to ensure competence and 
capacity for gender mainstreaming’.88 The reference to gender mainstreaming in this context 
represents a degree of progress, as its inclusion in a UN international environmental law and policy 
document of this prominence is undoubtedly significant and an indication that the concept has gained 
considerable currency. TFWW also contains explicit resolutions to undertake legal and administrative 
reform to ensure that women have equal access to: economic resources;
89
 education; basic services and 
‘...health care services, including addressing women’s sexual and reproductive health, and ensuring 
universal access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable modern methods of family planning’.90 
Again, these are not new developments but serve to underline systemic failures in addressing existing 
commitments. Furthermore, the absence of specific reference to women’s reproductive rights (caving 
to pressure from conservative religious lobbying) is one of the most controversial elements in TFWW 
and is described by Gro Harlem Brundtland as a ‘step backwards’ from previous agreements.91  
Gender issues also benefitted indirectly from the more general coverage of the role of major groups 
and stakeholders that featured in the ‘Renewing Political Commitment’ section of the TFWW. The 
acknowledgement that the ‘meaningful and active participation’ of major groups and other 
stakeholders is a requirement of sustainable development and commitments to work more closely with 
these entities in order to ‘encourage’ such participation ‘as appropriate in processes that contribute to 
decision making, planning and implementation of policies and programmes for sustainable 
development at all levels’ is significant.92 Civil society engagement is also promoted in this regard93 
and, significantly, gender is accorded discrete coverage again at this stage in the document, which 
states that: 
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We underscore that women have a vital role to play in achieving sustainable development. We 
recognize the leadership role of women and we resolve to promote gender equality and women’s 
empowerment and to ensure their full and effective participation in sustainable development 
policies, programmes and decision-making at all levels.
94
 
That TFWW includes gender issues is to be expected given that role of women as a major group has 
been actively fostered in the sustainable development context since the first Rio summit and in 
particular through the development of Agenda 21 and the work of the CSD. The significant element is 
the degree of engagement that is exhibited in TFWW – gender concerns appear frequently in the 
document, both discretely and as a cross-cutting concern in other areas, such as participation. This can 
be viewed as evidence of the successful entrenchment of gender issues in the UN’s conception of 
sustainability at least in principle - though practice is of course a very different matter and it is equally 
significant that limited progress in these issues on the ground has necessitated so much reiteration of 
existing  
TFWW also, inevitably given the omnipresence of the issue in international environmental affairs 
touched on climate change, though its role in this area is tangential and any observations to be made 
would necessarily be in deference to the main UN climate change regime. Nonetheless, perhaps in part 
due to the slow progress of the UNFCCC process, climate change appears first in the ‘Renewing 
Political Commitment’ section of the document, which recognises it as a ‘... cross-cutting and 
persistent crisis’ and underscoring the fact that it requires ‘... urgent and ambitious action, in 
accordance with the principles and provisions of the UNFCCC.’95 This view does however fail to 
acknowledge that the necessary political will to give substantive legal effect to this supposed urgency 
appears to be signally lacking in the climate change regime.
96
 Further coverage for climate change 
appears in the Framework for Action and Follow-up section of TFWW where climate change, 
likgender, is identified among the thematic areas and cross-sectoral issues. In contrast with 
sustainability, which is very much the province on the UNCSD and is therefore treated at some length, 
the coverage of climate change is necessarily limited as it falls under the remit of the UNFCCC. Thus 
TFWW is more or less confined to handwringing, for example, noting with:  
‘...grave concern the significant gap between the aggregate effect of Parties’ mitigation pledges in 
terms of global annual emissions of greenhouse gases by 2020 and aggregate emission pathways 
consistent with having a likely chance of holding the increase in global average temperature below 
2 °C or 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels.’
97
  
This is accompanied by various exhortations to the UNFCCC signatories (this is at best somewhat 
disingenuous as these are broadly the same states) regime, to act for example to operationalise the new 
Green Climate Fund
98
 and urging them to fully implement their UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol 
commitments and subsequent decisions. 
In conclusion, TFWW did offer some reassurance that women’s/gender issues are now established 
in principle in international environmental law and policy, even if it underlines the fact that their 
realisation in practice is a good deal more problematic. Rio+20 understandably had less to say about 
climate change and did not really consider the interface between climate change and gender issues, 
and though it did at least serve to reiterate calls for urgent action, in this regard it has little of 
substance to offer as this is really a matter for the UNFCCC regime.  
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Conclusion 
Recognition of the need to address gender inequality, sustainability and climate change and the 
participation rights and practices that comprise a significant means of engaging with them has, in 
principle at least, become part of mainstream international environmental policy and law, though its 
practical impact to date remains questionable. Nonetheless the debate which has been generated in 
these complex and intersecting areas has at least given both cause and opportunity to reflect on the 
issues that they raise in a more sophisticated and nuanced, less simplistic fashion than policy debate of 
yore. Considering the undoubted overlaps, conflicts, tensions and synergies that exist between them it 
is imperative that we devote careful consideration to the challenges posed by attempting to address 
these crucial crosscutting themes and their ramifications. Taking each of them forward from 
recognition in principle to fully engaging with them in practice will require the development of 
coherent, connected and undoubtedly hotly contested policy initiatives. These are necessary in order to 
generate and support new, sustainable and therefore viable (in the fullest sense of the word) laws that 
can and will fundamentally alter societal practice. This remains our great(est) challenge and rising to it 
will not be easy, but then again, it would be naive to think that such complex problems are likely to be 
adequately addressed by simplistic solutions.  
In our response to the challenges of sustainability and climate change (and indeed to climate 
change as a sustainability issue) one of the core priorities must be that we act in full recognition of the 
universal nature of the governance gender gap which applies across all areas of state-craft and not least 
those under consideration here. It applies (though to varying degrees) at state level regardless of 
economic status, religion or institutional arrangements.
99
 The governance gender gap is however 
arguably just as manifest at transnational and international levels, (though it differs in magnitude 
according to the ethos and practices of the particular IGOs concerned).However, lest it should be 
thought that addressing the issues involved is merely a narrow sectoral concern, it is worth observing 
that women’s equal involvement in governance generally improves the ability of policies to deliver for 
all citizens.
100
 In addition, where environmental governance is concerned, women tend to bring a 
distinctive and valuable perspective to the table;
101
 one that on even the most conservative predictions 
of the scope of the impacts of climate change impacts is likely to be crucial. Women are, and this 
would seem to be borne out by the weight of societal experience since the industrial revolution, are 
often unconvinced by technological optimism and the resultant belief that science can solve all of the 
problems that we face. As a result, they, place a premium on individual responsibility and behaviour 
change as central to addressing environmental degradation.
102
 Given that climate change seems set, 
even if only the most minimal predictions are realised, to challenge not just international and national 
governance, but ultimately individual lifestyle choices, there is much to be said for giving heed to this 
perspective. Starting with the successor to the Kyoto Protocol, the core question that needs to be posed 
is: how are we rising to the challenge posed by shaping ‘a world after this’? Experience thus far, and 
particularly latterly, with the FCCC seemingly in what amounts to little more than a holding pattern 
(as signified by the insufficiently ambitious Cancun Agreements
103
 and the adoption a promise of only 
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deferred action at Durban in 2011)
104
 is less than encouraging given the acknowledged urgency of the 
challenges that we face. For the purposes of the concerns raised in this paper, these repeated delays 
may however actually prove fortuitous in allowing time for a mainstreamed approach to gender to gain 
traction in the UNFCCC process, which, while not without its difficulties, would ultimately serve to 
improve any outcomes generated. 
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Instrument Choice and Replication 
Christina Voigt* 
Abstract 
In climate law, we have witnessed the establishment of innovative market-based instruments, such as 
emissions trading, the Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation and REDD+. The aim of 
these instruments is the increase in cost-effectiveness in climate mitigation. These innovative 
instruments, while having attracted significant interest from economic actors, have shown significant 
shortcomings in terms of certainty of result and potential for circumvention, misuse and negative side-
effects. At the same time, there is ongoing discussion of replicating some of these instruments in the 
new international climate agreement currently negotiated under Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 
(ADP). Moreover, the replication of market-based instruments is also being considered to other 
environmental challenges, most prominent among them biodiversity and ecosystem conservation. 
This paper brief discusses both the possibilities and dangers of replicating market-based climate 
mitigation instruments in other areas of environmental law. In particular, it identifies lessons that can 
be learned from climate instruments and ways to avoid some mistakes from being made in other fields. 
Such lessons include the need for clear rules and the need for robust methodologies and data, the 
challenges to design market-based instruments in a way which secures that the largest part of available 
financial resources goes to the environmental project or good and is not captured during the process, 
and the need for strong legal rules that protect non-financial benefits. The market itself will not 
naturally deliver non-financial benefits or address non-economic interests. Rather, these interests and 
benefits have to be “regulated in” the mechanism. Finally, financial transfers should be based on 
monitored, reported and verified results (both on the primary, but also secondary/indirect market-
impacts). Result-based ex-post payments not only reflect the true value of the environmental “good” 
which is being paid for, they can also keep corruption and fraud at bay. 
Still, markets are means – not ends. As means they are just one tool in the toolbox. While for some 
environmental policies, suitable market-solution can be designed, with care required. For other 
environmental ends, such as nature conservation and ecosystem protection, traditional command-and-
control approaches might lead to more secure, predictable and effective results. 
1. Introduction 
Climate change has triggered the establishment of a number of innovative market-based instruments, 
such as emissions trading, the Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation and REDD+. 
The aim of these instruments is the flexible and cost-effective reduction of greenhouse gases (GHGs). 
While the establishment of market-based climate change mitigation instruments has been hailed as the 
“cutting edge”1 of international environmental law and an innovative approach to solving the biggest 
challenge of our time, implementation and practice has shown significant shortcomings in terms of 
certainty and permanence of result as well as a potential for circumvention, misuse and undesired, 
negative side-effects.  
Yet, there is ongoing discussion of replicating some of these instruments in the new international 
climate agreement currently negotiated under Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). 
Moreover, the replication of market-based instruments is also being considered to other environmental 
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challenges, most prominent among them biodiversity and ecosystem conservation, by, e.g. payments 
for ecosystem services (PES).
2
 The use of market-based approaches is also envisaged to spur 
renewable energy. Energy+, an initiative to increase access to renewable energy and to drive low-
carbon development modeled on the results-based financial support schemes for the protection of 
tropical forests, is being promoted by Norway.
3
 
This policy brief will discuss both the possibilities and dangers of replicating market-based climate 
mitigation instruments in other areas of environmental law. It is divided in five parts: After, first, 
briefly describing market-based climate instruments, we, second, look at the replicability of climate 
instruments. Third, we discuss the desirability of a market-approach to other environmental issues, 
before, fourth, we ask what lessons can be learned from market-based climate instruments and, fifth, 
how to avoid some mistakes being made in the climate field.  
2. Market-based instruments for climate change mitigation  
Developed countries - the Parties included in Annex I to the UNFCCC - can make use of so-called 
‘flexible mechanisms’ of the Kyoto Protocol. These flexible mechanisms are market-based tools that 
allow for meeting emissions reduction obligations by means of joint projects among Annex I countries 
(Joint Implementation – JI, Article 6 Kyoto Protocol), projects in developing countries (Clean 
Development Mechanism – CDM, Article 12 Kyoto Protocol) and emissions trading among Annex I 
countries (Article 17 Kyoto Protocol). While CDM and JI are project-based mechanisms, enabling 
Annex I countries to cooperate on specific greenhouse gas reduction projects with other countries 
where abatement costs are lower, international emissions trading aims at the establishment of an 
international market for buying and selling emission credits, which can be used to comply with the 
specified reduction targets. Tradable emission units can be the assigned amounts units (AAUs) 
accorded to Annex B countries of the Protocol or the rights derived from project-based activities, i.e. 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from CDM activities and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) 
from JI. Emission units can be traded freely on the market and their price will depend on demand and 
supply. Each Government can issue as many emission certificates as quantified by its assigned 
amounts and allocate them to public and private entities according to its national climate change 
policy. In order to prevent overselling, a country is required to hold a certain minimum of units in its 
national registry at any time (so called Commitment Period Reserve, CPR).
4
 This system is supposed 
to stimulate policy changes since polluting entities have to decide whether it is more costly to buy 
emission certificates or reduce the amount of GHG emissions. 
By introducing a quantitative cap on emissions from a number of developed countries together with 
flexible trading mechanisms, a tradable commodity or currency was created (1 unit= 1 t CO2 eqv.). In 
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other words, the Kyoto Protocol, as well as the regional implementation in the EU (the European 
Union’s Emissions Trading System- EU ETS5) and national emission trading systems creates an 
artificial market – both in terms of supply and demand. Assigned amounts (AU) can be divided up into 
units (Assigned Amount Units – AAUs) allowing Annex I Parties (37 and the EU) to participate in the 
flexibility mechanisms. The same applies to ERUs (JI) and CERs (CDM), which in sum amounts to a 
combination of cap&trade and baseline&credit systems.  
A more recent development in climate mitigation instruments is the establishment of a mechanism 
to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries, usually referred 
to as REDD+.
6
 The framework for such mechanism was negotiated under the 15
th
 Conference of the 
Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC in Copenhagen in 2009 and adopted at the 16th COP in Cancun in 
2010.
7
 Under REDD+, tropical developing countries shall be provided with financial incentives to 
slow, halt and reverse forest cover and carbon loss, in accordance with national circumstances, 
consistent with the ultimate objective of the Convention, as stated in Article 2 UNFCCC. These 
incentives are typically financed by more developed countries. REDD+ is an incentive system as 
payments can be linked to performance. In addition, REDD+ can offer developing countries 
substantial financial benefits for protecting their forests, and may be more cost-effective than other 
emission-reduction policies. At the current stage, REDD+ is not linked to a market-approach. The 
framework for the mechanism, however, allows for the elaboration of a market-link.
8
 Such link, 
although opposed by a number of forest countries, such as Bolivia and Venezuela, might be an 
unavoidable requirement for making available and scaling up financial resources necessary for a 
functioning, results-based REDD+ mechanism. 
3. Rationale 
The establishment of market-based mechanisms is a political and regulatory choice. Traditionally 
“command and control” legislation was for a long time the practiced approach to reducing pollution of 
environmental media. In recent years, a move to incentive-based regulation (“carrot and stick”) could 
be observed, in particular with respect to climate mitigation policies. Here, market “thinking” in terms 
of demand and supply are used as a means to pursue environmental ends, e.g. reduction and limitation 
of GHG emissions. Carbon markets have the advantage that they harness market power for climate 
mitigation and create a direct incentive for private sector investment.  
The rationale behind market-mechanism is to increase the cost-effectiveness of climate mitigation 
measures. Market actors have an interest in reducing the cost of regulatory compliance. Therefore, 
they will search for the least-cost alternative. Cost-effectiveness is a general principle mentioned 
explicitly in Art. 3.3 UNFCCC: “policies and measures should be cost-effective so as to ensure global 
benefits at the lowest possible costs”. The use of market-mechanisms purports to reach a certain 
emission reduction goal at the least possible costs. As a consequence, market-based measures are 
considered an optimal use of financial and environmental resources – corresponding to the adage of 
“buying more climate for the same (or less) money”.  
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The flexible instruments of the Kyoto Protocol are thus intended to serve two goals: first, to 
significantly lower compliance costs of the Kyoto Annex-I Parties with their emission reduction and 
limitation obligations. Since 1990 many of the Annex I Parties to the Kyoto Protocol have 
substantially increased their emissions. The commitment to collectively reduce emissions by 5% 
below 1990 levels by 2012 has therefore become commensurably more rigorous, and the potential 
economic impact of these obligations unparalleled in international law. The second goal is to provide 
incentives for sustainable development. It has been warned however that these mechanisms need to be 
governed by clear rules for emission reduction measurement and compliance procedures to ensure that 
measures taken by developed countries are accompanied by genuine emission reductions.
9
 
The flexibility mechanisms are based on the global geographic availability of mitigation efforts and 
the theory of ‘marginal abatement costs’. The cost of financing emission reduction is relatively lower 
in countries with lower levels of industrialization. Because location of abatement measures is 
climatically irrelevant, global cost-effectiveness prescribes basically that measures should be 
implemented where they are cheapest. 
Key developed countries considered the introduction of flexibility in the way they could implement 
their commitments as a requirement of equity. Part of the argument for flexibility was that marginal 
costs vary from country to country, from sector to sector and source to source.
10
 To require all 
countries to meet their targets by using a prescriptive list of policies and measures was considered 
insufficient and ineffective. Equity considerations therefore demanded flexibility in sharing the burden 
of meeting commitments. This flexibility is premised on the idea that countries with high costs for 
meeting their environmental obligations and countries that can provide low cost opportunities should 
benefit by cooperating and thereby exploiting comparative advantages.
11
 
While strong arguments can be made in favour of the use of flexible instruments, their 
implementation is all but plain sailing. Based on ethical arguments, emissions trading in particular has 
been characterized as ‘turning pollution into a commodity to be bought and sold’, thereby removing 
the ‘moral stigma that is properly associated with it … rendering pollution just another cost of doing 
business, like wages, benefits and rent.’12 The ‘legitimacy’ of such criticism depends on whether one 
considers all emissions of greenhouse gases to be ‘wrong’ by definition or whether to accept some 
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level of pollution. With regard to the emission of greenhouse gases, which also occur naturally, such 
absolute ethical positions are somewhat difficult to sustain. 
Another critical argument concerns the overall focus on economic efficiency and cost-minimization 
for Annex I Parties which may consolidate the economic dominance of industrialized countries by 
allowing them to ‘buy their way out of their obligations’. This argument can be met with reference to 
the ‘price tag’ that is put on emissions by a cap-and-trading system. ‘Buying out’, in fact, entails 
internalizing the costs of emitting greenhouse gases. Furthermore, incentives to circumvent domestic 
reductions and to avoid necessary technological changes by Annex I Parties would be drastically 
reduced by a stringent regulatory framework for emissions trading coupled with a strong emission cap, 
the avoidance of ‘hot air’ as well as robust methodologies for baseline scenarios and additionality, and 
monitoring and reporting requirements backed up by an effective compliance and enforcement 
mechanism.  
Prior to the Kyoto Protocol, the use of market-based mechanisms as a tool in international 
agreements to address environmental concerns had not been widely tested. The primary focus of 
environmental regulation was on traditional command and control or voluntary approaches. Thus, only 
a very few countries had experience of emissions trading.
13
  
The application of economically motivated mechanisms on a global scale is thus unprecedented in 
international law. Project-based mechanisms that enable countries to carry out projects abroad in order 
to receive credits that could assist them in meeting their national commitments at the same time as 
they support development in host countries are absolutely novel. The regulation of these mechanisms 
therefore has been described as the ‘cutting edge of international environmental law’.14 It might not be 
too far off the point to generalize this statement to international law, at least as far as the complex and 
novel procedural and technical challenges as well as the moral, economic and environmental 
considerations which these new mechanisms as well as REDD+ raise are concerned. That the far-
reaching and speedy developments entailed by the mechanisms have attracted the close attention of 
States, the scientific community, business and environmental organisations alike is therefore not 
surprising. 
The clear advantage of flexibility mechanisms, such as emissions trading and joint implementation, 
is the finite number of emission units, clearly defining the environmental goal. This ‘absolute cap’, if 
combined with a strong compliance mechanism,
15
 ensures that it will become unattractive for States to 
emit more than they are allowed to under the Kyoto Protocol. 
The climate regime must – and the flexibility mechanisms make it more likely to – progressively 
convince a wide range of currently hesitant or resistant actors to reframe climate protection as the 
(only) sustainable way forward. This shift in conviction, however, involves not only legal measures, 
but complex and dynamic social processes. Still, as Mitchell supposed, ‘the flexibility mechanisms … 
may, over time, initiate social processes that lead to deep seated normative changes that, in turn, may 
produce the dramatic, long-term changes in human behaviour that are necessary to avert climate 
change.’16 
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The use of economic flexibility instruments, in particular the JI and CDM, can promote the 
development and distribution of new technologies, generating capital flows and transfer of 
technologies into regions with cheaper, older technologies or limited financial means and capacities to 
implement climate friendly technologies, promoting not only emission reductions at reduced costs but 
also positive feedback across the whole, global economy.
17
 
4. Replicability 
The main justification for these instruments in the field of climate change mitigation is the climatic 
irrelevance of the location of emissions cuts as well as the increased cost-effectiveness of a flexible 
approach. This approach may not necessarily be applicable to other environmental threats such as 
biodiversity loss or accumulating chemical and other pollution, which can create so-called “hot spots”. 
A market-approach based on tradable quotas can be particularly problematic for: 
4.1 Non-accumulative environmental problems: Some environmental challenges are the 
accumulative effect of a wealth of different contributions. Climate change is a prime example, where 
the accumulated greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are caused by a myriad of anthropogenic and 
non-anthropogenic sources, spread over the entire globe and covering decades, if not centuries, of 
activities. A global market system of emission reductions thus mirrors the fragmented and wide-spread 
nature of emission sources. Some environmental challenges, however, occur locally, caused by local 
drivers. For these environmental challenges it is important to address the cause of the problem where it 
is located, not where it is cheapest to mitigate, e.g. endangered species only exist in a particular area. 
4.2 Accumulative environmental problems with local effects: Emissions of GHGs do not have local 
climate effects (as such), although they can contribute to local air pollution. In terms of climate change 
mitigation, actions can be dispersed globally. In other words, the creation of “local hotspots” of 
greenhouse gas emissions as a result of the concentration of mitigation measures in some places and 
the absence of such measures as well as high levels of emissions in others do not create ‘local climate 
change’. Other pollutants (sometimes by-products of GHGs) can create local pollution, which needs to 
be remedied at the location of release, e.g. emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon 
monoxide, fine particulate matter, organic compounds like benzene, toluene and poly-aromatic 
hydrocarbons (PAH), and heavy metals in particulate matter (lead, cadmium) can cause local 
concentrations to reach levels which are harmful to human health and the environment.  
4.3 MRV-ability: In order for market-instruments to be effective in terms of reaching the 
environmental end they are supposed to support, it is important that they function with a high degree 
of accuracy.
18
 In other words, the environmental ‘good’ which corresponds to the tradable unit needs 
to be reliably measured and verified. Arguably, ‘end of the pipe’ industrial emissions of GHG can be 
accurately measured, reported and verified (“MRV-ability”). However, this situation already becomes 
much more difficult when it comes to baseline and crediting systems like the CDM. Here, emission 
reductions need to be measured and verified against hypothetical baselines (of what would have 
happened in the absence of the project). Such counterfactuals can never be proven with certainty and 
thereby create a challenge to the measurability of emissions reductions and the accuracy of the quota. 
The same applies to systems with intensity targets, e.g. CO2 emissions per kwh or carbon intensity per 
dollar of GDP.
19
 Intensity targets lack the quantifiability of the overall emission reduction goal. 
Translating them into tradable quotas comprises of inherent calculation and measurement challenges, 
which can affect the effectiveness of the market instrument. This situation becomes even more 
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difficult when it comes to measuring the functioning of complex natural systems (ecosystems), as 
required for a “payment for ecosystem services (PES)”-system. In REDD, which in a sense is a 
specific PES for “forest carbon services”, this problem is attempted being solved by a complicated 
combination of remote sensing (by satellite) and on the ground checks of anthropogenic forest-related 
greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks, forest carbon stocks and forest area 
changes.
20
 Extending payment systems for ecological services to, for example, water or air filtration 
might hold insurmountable technological challenges in terms of strict monitoring and verification of 
such services. Moreover, attempts to extend the REDD+ system to cover all terrestrial carbon, 
including agricultural activities, might still find their limit in technologies suited for capturing and 
measuring comprehensive carbon (stock) changes.  
5. Desirability of replicating market-based instruments 
This part discusses the desirability of replicating a market approach to addressing other environmental 
challenges than climate change. In a non-exhaustive manner, some critical arguments launched against 
a market-based approach on the basis of experiences made with climate instruments will be discussed.  
5.1 No market without rules: As said above, market mechanisms are means to an environmental 
end, not an end in themselves. Therefore, it is important that the legal framework for market 
instruments ensures the capacity of the mechanism to reach the desired environmental end, or in other 
words, safeguard the market instrument’s environmental integrity. As a strategy for revenue 
maximisation, market actors will always strive to find the least-costly way for complying with 
regulatory requirements. Law therefore has an important role in “staking the field” for market players. 
This applies, in particular to clear definition for eligibility and possible conditionality criteria for 
participation, clear rules for acquisition and transfers of tradable quotas, requirements of robust 
measurement, monitoring, reporting and independent verification systems as well as transparency in 
all stages of market transactions. Moreover, legal rules need to be in place for addressing and 
protecting the interests and rights of all relevant stakeholders, whether they are market-actors or not. 
Protecting interests of stakeholders requires not only ensuring procedural rights, such as public 
participation and civil involvement. It also demands the respect of substantial rights, such as land 
tenure and property rights.
21
 Finally, the system needs to be safeguarded against misuse by control, 
review and enforcement measures as well as sanctions for violations and circumventions. 
5.2 Cap-and trade markets and innovation: Emissions trading has been criticised for not 
stimulating technological innovation.
22
 As we identified above, the purpose of the “trade” is to 
minimize the costs of reducing emissions. Emission reduction is not achieved by the trading; it is 
achieved by capping emissions at a certain level. However, experiences with the early EU ETS have 
shown that the cap has been set too high, giving in to the demands of affected industries. As a result, 
surplus allowances partly due to faulty baseline data and partly to lack of political will, watered out the 
environmental effectiveness of the early regime. Insufficient targets, carve-outs for particularly 
exposed, competitive industries and ‘low-hanging fruit’ solutions which required no technological 
changes lead to unexpectedly low prices and created no or very limited stimulus for innovation. 
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Moreover, the notion of flexibility inherent in a cap-and-trade approach lead, for instance, the 
Norwegian regulator to abstain from setting technology requirements (for example the use of best 
available technology) for those installations which are covered by the Norwegian emissions trading 
scheme, when granting them pollution licenses under the Norwegian Pollution Control Act. Innovation 
is spurred by high carbon prices and by regulation (or - in the absence thereof - incentives) for 
innovation. But if the cap is too weak (speak too high), prices of emission allowances will be low. 
Low prices coupled with no regulatory requirements for technological standards will lock-in the 
technological status quo. 
5.3 The three E’s: There is an inherent difficulty to avoid balancing what we can call the “three 
E’s”: Environmental integrity, Equity, Effectiveness. Focus on one element often goes to the detriment 
of one or both the other. The difficult relationship of equity and effectiveness lies in the inherent trade-
off that those measures that are effective may not be equitable or those that are equitable may not lead 
to significant emissions reductions. In other words, creating an equitable system by taking account of 
differences, e.g. compensating the burden of highly emitting, competitive industries or exempting 
certain sectors from the scope of emissions trading, in order to protect competitiveness of certain 
industries can take away the incentive to reduce GHGs and thereby affects the effectiveness of the 
regime. The same applies to grandfathering, i.e. benefitting of polluting industries by allocating 
allowances free of charge. From 2013 onwards the EU ETS foresees auctioning of allowances. This 
change in allocation modality is intended to remedy the before-mentioned concerns. However, also the 
new trading system will provide certain exemptions for competitive industries. Moreover, the focus on 
economics and equitable allocation of emission rights can divert attention from the environmental 
integrity of the measures and possible negative side effects on the environment. Environmental 
integrity depends on (i) stringency of the target (political decision), (ii) MRV (accurate and verifiable 
data), (iii) ensuring that regulation is not circumvented, i.e. robust and credible national laws and 
institutions, and enforcement possibilities, and (iv) avoiding of negative side-effects and enhancing 
positive co-benefits. Environmental integrity, however, may reduce cost-effectiveness because it 
requires accurate data and strong regulation, which may lead to longer lead times, additional checks 
and balances, as well as verification of the outcome. 
5.4 Clear policy objective: Regulations for carbon markets need a clear policy objective. The 
reality of flexibility instrument, in particular the CDM, but also the new REDD+ mechanism, 
however, is very different. Here, a multitude in objectives is sought pursued, with the effect that none 
is effectively safeguarded. The CDM example is meant to illustrate this point: At the heart of the CDM 
lies a tridimensional problem: the pursuit of at least three different and often competing policy 
objectives: environmental integrity, sustainable development and economic efficiency. 
First, the CDM is supposed to deliver real, measurable and lasting climate benefits; this capacity is 
often referred to as its environmental integrity. So far, the environmental integrity of the CDM rests 
largely on the ‘integrity of the process’ carried out by the UN institutions and organs involved in the 
CDM and corresponds to the technical and administrative capacity of the EB to develop and apply 
methodologies that validate projects and certify emissions that are additional to those which would 
have occurred in the absence of the CDM. The integrity of the CDM thus depends on applying 
conservative methods on accuracy and transparency (allowing for a safe margin of error). Moreover, it 
depends on the confidence of the EB to not certify registered projects that fail to meet agreed criteria. 
It also requires decision making that is not politically biased or influenced or under the threat of legal 
claims for compensation of financial losses of project participants.
23
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Second, in addition to environmental integrity, the CDM must promote the sustainable 
development of host countries. As mentioned above, a number of uncertainties exist in this respect. 
Yet, the requirement of additionality is intricately related to the sustainable development goal. In 
practice, projects that are clearly additional have proven to contribute very little to the sustainable 
development of host countries. Projects that are undoubtedly additional are those that would not be 
economically feasible without the CDM, such as HFC23 and projects involving other industrial gases. 
Yet these projects use end-of-pipe technology that does not bring about any technological changes in 
terms of avoiding the generation of GHGs or any other sustainable benefits. Some of those projects 
even give incentives for producing more GHG gases. On the other hand, projects that do contribute to 
sustainable development (e.g., renewable energy projects, fuel-switch projects) are often not 
additional. The CDM does not play any, or only an insignificant, role in the investment decision. 
Investment in these kinds of projects is often based on ‘business as usual’ economic calculations. 
Third, the CDM needs to be economically interesting. In order for the CDM to play a role in the 
climate market while being a significant response to climate change, it must succeed in attracting a 
‘critical mass’ of participants, especially project developers and investors, which are willing to 
participate in ‘good’ CDM projects, namely projects that are both additional and contribute to 
sustainable development. This will require transparency, consistency, certainty and predictability of 
the process, reduction of lead times (especially the duration of review) and transaction and 
administrative costs, and increased overall efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
24
  
The dilemma, however, is that projects that both are additional and contribute to sustainable 
development are extremely rare and often have to go through a long, opaque and very bureaucratic 
process before registration, which affects their economic efficiency. In this context, Werksman
25
 noted 
that ‘[a]t issue is the tension between the care required to ensure the environmental quality of projects, 
and the bureaucratic efficiency and technocratic precision required by the demands of the market’. The 
crisis described above indicates an imbalance of interests tilting towards market demands and 
surrendering to market imperatives. It also indicates that the care required to ensure environmental 
integrity and to deliver on all three objectives of the CDM is not systematically built into its design.  
“If it is feasible to establish a market to implement a policy, no policy-maker can afford to do 
without”. If J.H. Dales was right in this statement, then a market-mechanism needs to correlate to “a 
policy” as in “one” – not many. However, given the complex regulatory landscape in which modern 
market-mechanisms are established, the identification of just one policy objective might not only be 
impossible, it might in fact be ignorant of the many crossing objectives inherent in climate and other 
environmental policies, which pay tribute to legitimate expectations of different stakeholders, both 
market and non-market, private and public. 
5.5 Limited regulatory capture: Non-market/indirect causes of environmental destruction: With 
cap-and-trade systems for climate gases, the regulatory capture reaches no further than stationary 
emission sources, largely industrial installations, and lately some mobile sources, i.e. air carriers. In 
other words, emissions trading is an “end of pipe” mechanism. Industrial installations responsible for 
emissions need to account for their pollution by measuring their “smoke stack emissions” and by 
having an equivalent number of quotas. However, GHG emissions outside the regulatory scope of an 
emissions trading system, indirect drivers of emissions or global drivers are not captured. Moreover, 
other environmental problems, such as deforestation or the destruction of ecological systems and 
functions can have diverse actors and causes which may not be captured by a trading scheme.  
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6. Lessons learned 
What lessons can be learned from climate instruments and how to avoid some mistakes made in the 
climate field from being made in other fields?  
6.1 Clear rules and the need for robust methodologies and data: If market mechanisms are 
introduced, the market has a tendency “to grab the ball and run with it”. The creation of market-based 
solutions to environmental problems and the introduction of flexibility and cost-effectiveness does not 
mean a “lawless” space. Markets are means – not ends. Rather, care and foresight must be exercised in 
the drafting of the legal framework, including binding rules, which define the legitimate scope for 
activities. These include, for example, rules that safeguard against perverse policy incentives, against 
violations of various human rights, but also against high transaction costs and logistic and 
administrative bottlenecks. While the rules must be strong and clear, they should not be too complex 
or lead to lengthy, bureaucratic processes. The challenge is that monitoring, reporting and validation 
(MRV) of GHG emissions – while necessary - already is difficult. MRV of avoided emissions 
(REDD+) is yet on the limit of technological feasibility, and even more so when it comes to create a 
robust accounting system for ecosystem services. In fact, for reasons of technical difficulties of how to 
measure avoided deforestation, this issue was not included in the Kyoto Protocol. The functioning and 
effectiveness of any market-based mechanism and its capacity to deliver the expected outcome 
depends on careful design, implementation and control. 
6.2 Bureaucracy and Overall efficiency: Pioneering research has suggested that an average of 
approximately 30% of the money spent on the open market buying CDM credits goes directly to 
project operating and capital expenditure costs.
26
The largest part goes to broker's premiums (about 
30%, understood to represent the risk of a project not delivering) and the project shareholders' 
dividend (another 30%). The researchers noted that the sample of projects studied was small, the range 
of figures was wide and that their methodology of estimating values slightly overstated the average 
broker's premium. The challenge, therefore, is to design market-based instruments in a way which 
secures that the largest part of available financial resources goes to the environmental project or good 
and is not captured during the process. 
6.3 Avoiding negative side effects – enhancing co-benefits: Market-instruments pursue the goal 
they are designed for and accord to least-cost demands. This can lead to situations where unintended 
side-effects occur, which may be harmful to non-market interests. As we discussed above in the 
context of the CDM, projects might be successful in terms of emission reductions. Whether they also 
provide sustainable development benefits or are harmful to the environment or people affected by a 
project, remains (largely) outside the scope of UN-based registration and verification of projects.  
Different from the CDM, in the framework for REDD+, a number of safeguards exist which are 
meant to ensure that REDD+ activities do not harm, but enhance positive impacts on the conservation 
of biological diversity, human rights, in particular indigenous peoples, forest governance.
27
 While 
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these safeguards have been negotiated with great care and controversy, it still remains somewhat 
unclear how they are supposed to work, how they are financed, and how they are monitored and 
reported. So far, a system for providing information on how the safeguards are being addressed and 
respected is all that is in place for ensuring their implementation. In the latest negotiation rounds, 
however, it became clear that when market-approaches are considered, safeguard compliance must 
become conditionality for financial transfers. In this context, the evolving financing framework for 
REDD+ notes that “in the light of the experience gained from current and future demonstration 
activities, appropriate market-based approaches could be developed..., ensuring that environmental 
integrity is preserved, that the provisions of decisions 1/CP.16, appendix I and II are fully respected 
and should be consistent with the relevant provisions of decision 1/CP.16.”28  
In order to have a market-based instrument delivering on non-market benefits requires strong legal 
rules that protect such benefits. As the market itself will not naturally provide for such non-financial 
issues, they have to be “regulated in” the mechanism. Moreover, transparency in these issues by robust 
MRV systems also for safeguard compliance increases the possibility for extra-market players, e.g. 
NGOs, to keep track of market impacts on people and the environment. In addition, where safeguard 
compliance occurs as a conditionality or eligibility requirement for financial transfers – as we may see 
in the development of REDD+ - the internalization of non-market values would be based both on legal 
as well as economic rationales – making compliance with non-market requirements all the more likely. 
Finally, financial transfers should be based on monitored, reported and verified results (both on the 
primary, but also secondary/indirect market-impacts). Such ex-post payments not only reflect the true 
value of the “good” which is being paid for. A results-based-approach can also keep corruption and 
fraud at bay.
29
 
7. Conclusions 
Market-based climate instruments are an unprecedented experiment; a game that the world cannot 
afford losing. Given the severity of the challenge, it must be asked whether this is the right way to go.  
Regulatory ecosystem service markets
30
 are established through legislation that creates demand for 
a particular ecosystem service by setting a ‘cap’ on the damage to, or investment focused on, an 
ecosystem service. The users of the service, or at least the people who are responsible for diminishing 
that service, respond either by complying directly or by trading with others who are able to meet the 
regulation at lower cost. Buyers are defined by the legislation, but are usually private-sector 
companies or other institutions. Sellers may also be companies or other entities that the legislation 
allows to be sellers and who are going beyond regulatory requirements. 
Carbon markets have the advantage that they harness market power for climate mitigation and 
create a direct incentive for private sector investment. But it is an artificial market; it must create 
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demand and supply. Functioning markets depend on sustained demand. Demand depends on 
regulation and ambitious (climate) targets. Targets must also be dynamic and react to changing 
economic realities. Recent experiences with the EU ETS show that even in the context of 
comparatively ambitious and strong rules and institutions, incentives for investments can vanish as the 
broader economic context changes. In order to guard against vanishing demand, transactions had to be 
backed by funds or minimum price guarantees. In a market where supply is artificially created, there is 
the danger of oversupply by over-allocation (grandfathering), or of economic downsizing which lead 
to threatening the market of flooding with quotas and falling prices. The mobilization of large amounts 
of private sector funding depends on sustained demand for credits and hence ambitious, long-term 
targets and effective links to national compliance markets. 
Here lies the problem for REDD+. Price levels must be high enough to create incentives for 
alternative land use (e.g. conservation). Large drivers of deforestation and destruction of ecosystems, 
by, e.g., infrastructure and housing developments, palm oil plantations, beef soy, mineral extraction 
etc., drive up prices for REDD+ and other ecosystem services. A functioning market-instrument would 
need to address destructive policies and drivers and enhance the market-value of those policies which 
protect the environmental objective pursued by the mechanism.  
However, in order to establish market-based instruments which pursue environmental goals, the 
demand side of the market has to be created. With regard to REDD+, the overarching question of who 
would buy REDD+ credits or units (if they were to be issued) still remains unanswered. There is, as of 
today, no compliance market and the voluntary market for REDD+ credits has minimal volume. What 
remains is investment into REDD+ policies for reasons of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) or 
pure altruism and philanthropy. While the latter are “nice to have” – their volume will never sum up to 
the financial flows necessary for successfully fighting tropical deforestation (and resulting GHGs 
emissions). 
Coming back to the Dale’s adage “If it is feasible to establish a market to implement a policy, no 
policy-maker can afford to do without”, we can conclude that the feasibility may be the problem with 
environmental market-based instruments. While good arguments can be made in favour of such 
instruments, experiences made so far with climate related market instruments show significant 
shortcomings. If markets are to work for the environment, then strong regulation has to be in place 
ensuring both the environmental end and guarding against negative side-effects. Markets are means – 
not ends. As means they are a tool in the toolbox, but not the only one. While for some environmental 
policies, suitable market-solution can be designed, with care required. For other environmental ends, 
such as nature conservation and ecosystem protection, traditional command-and-control approaches 
might lead to more secure, predictable and effective results. 
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Concluding remarks: climate change in the aftermath of Rio+20 
Fabiano de Andrade Corrêa* 
The workshop that originated this collection of working papers aimed at taking advantage of the 
momentum generated by the Rio+20 Summit, and all the debate it generated about sustainable 
development, the transition to a green economy and related issues, to analyze the question of the 
dominance of climate change in International – Environmental and Sustainable Development – Law. 
Our intention was to create a framework to exchange ideas about climate change from several 
perspectives: analyzing the climate discourse and how it became so prominent within the global 
governance scenario nowadays, the evolution of the climate change policy framework and the way it 
related to all the stakeholders concerned, how the instruments/policy measures designed within the 
climate change regime have been operating in practice, and whether they could be replicated in other 
policy areas. We expected that, by addressing these issues, we would be able to achieve conclusions 
about the arguable dominance of climate change in global environmental governance and whether this 
could be portrayed as positive or negative. Further, we hoped that, after the Rio+20, the discussions 
that took place during the workshop could be evaluated in a comparative perspective regarding the 
outcomes reached at the Summit.  
We invited four legal experts from different institutions to discuss with us some of these topics. 
The three working papers presented here are the result of our discussions at the workshop. The first 
presentation, by Stephen Humphreys, addressed the issue of the evolution of the public discourse 
regarding climate change. Stephen’s paper aims to think through the significance of what can be called 
the ‘mainstreaming’ of climate science. It addresses the paradox that, despite the increasing success of 
climate change science at discursive level, the failure of that language to frame a viable solution to the 
problems climate change poses appear ever starker. Stephen concludes that today climate change 
functions primarily as discourse; that is, it provides a mechanism that serves fundamentally to 
restabilise the grounding principles of a dominant political economy and, as such, it now has no more 
chance of success. 
The second presentation, by Karen Morrow, aimed at discussing what kind of issues could be 
argued to be obscured by the climate regime and its dominant role within IEL. Her paper considers the 
position of women as an example of a stakeholder/major group that has, until very recently, been both 
accorded privileged participant status in the international sustainable development context and yet 
overlooked in the climate change regime. It examines the impact of activist and theoretical 
ecofeminism in prompting and shaping women’s engagement with the international polis in these 
areas and practical reasons for according broad participation rights to women (and by implication, 
given the inclusive approach taken by ecofeminism, to other stakeholder groups) in these contexts. It 
looks at how women’s participation has developed in sustainable development and climate change 
contexts and consider the ramifications of this including: benefits of and barriers to wider participation 
in the climate change regime and how the latter could be addressed. 
The third presentation, by Christina Voigt, aimed at discussing the innovative legal instruments 
developed with the climate regime and how/if these could be replicated in other policy areas as 
adequate tools to face sustainability challenges. Her paper considers that, in climate law, we have 
witnessed the establishment of innovative market-based instruments, whose aim is the increase in cost-
effectiveness in climate mitigation. She argues that these innovative instruments, while having 
attracted significant interest from economic actors, have shown significant shortcomings in terms of 
certainty of result and potential for circumvention, misuse and negative side-effects. Moreover, she 
discusses both the possibilities and dangers of replicating market-based climate mitigation instruments 
in other areas of environmental law. In particular, her paper identifies lessons that can be learned from 
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climate instruments and ways to avoid some mistakes from being made in other fields. Such lessons 
include the need for clear rules and the need for robust methodologies and data, the challenges to 
design market-based instruments in a way which secures that the largest part of available financial 
resources goes to the environmental project or good and is not captured during the process, and the 
need for strong legal rules that protect non-financial benefits.  
In short, the working papers resulting from the conference are concerned with climate and change, 
as stated in the introduction to this volume. Ate the same time, they provide us with a somewhat 
negative view about climate governance. We can infer that the climate discourse, while in fact playing 
a relatively strong or dominant role in global politics nowadays, functions more as discourse than 
actual leadership towards changing the (unsustainable) status quo of environmental governance. 
Further, the discussions we had pointed out that climate governance, while allowing the emergence of 
non-traditional governance issues, is not always an inclusive process and that many relevant 
stakeholders might be left out of this process. Finally, while several innovative instruments have been 
created to address the challenge of climate governance, its peculiar characteristics make it difficult to 
be easily replicable in other policy areas. In this regard, the conclusion of our discussions was that 
climate change can be considered as a relatively dominant policy objective, but one that does not 
necessarily provide a positive view of how a problem area can be best managed within a complex 
international institutional framework. It is this important to now ask ourselves where can climate 
change, as this ambiguous policy area, be situated within the global governance scenario in the 
aftermath of Rio+20. 
The Rio+20 outcomes can offer some guidance on how to view the relationship between climate 
change and two other relevant policy objectives which are key in global governance nowadays, 
namely sustainable development and the green economy, another major policy goal and broad concept 
that has been highjacking the international agenda. Rio+20 was not only marking twenty years since 
the UN Earth Summit in 1992, but also forty years since the UN Stockholm Conference on the Human 
Environment, a long process throughout which the concept of sustainable development was coined, 
mainstreamed, and discredited by many as a conflation of objectives. However, Rio+20 renewed 
sustainable development as a major goal of the international community. The Rio+20 Outcome 
Document, ‘The Future We Want’, states that the parties renew the commitment to sustainable 
development and to ensuring the promotion of an economically, socially and environmentally 
sustainable future for our planet and for present and future generations, acknowledging that 
mainstreaming sustainable development at all levels is needed, integrating economic, social and 
environmental aspects. Further, it states that ‘poverty eradication, changing unsustainable and 
promoting sustainable patterns of consumption and production and protecting and managing the 
natural resource base of economic and social development are the overarching objectives of and 
essential requirements for sustainable development. [We] also reaffirm the need to achieve sustainable 
development by promoting sustained, inclusive and equitable economic growth, creating greater 
opportunities for all, reducing inequalities, raising basic standards of living, fostering equitable social 
development and inclusion, and promoting integrated and sustainable management of natural 
resources and ecosystems that supports, inter alia, economic, social and human development while 
facilitating ecosystem conservation, regeneration and restoration and resilience in the face of new and 
emerging challenges’. (para. 3-4).  
Climate change, on the other hand, is portrayed as ‘a cross-cutting and persistent crisis’, which can 
‘undermine the ability of all countries, in particular, developing countries, to achieve sustainable 
development’ (para. 25). Further, climate change is said to be ‘one of the greatest challenges of our 
time (…) threatening food security and efforts to eradicate poverty and achieve sustainable 
development. In this regard we emphasize that adaptation to climate change represents an immediate 
and urgent global priority.’ (para. 190) 
Finally, the document states that ‘that there are different approaches, visions, models and tools 
available to each country, in accordance with its national circumstances and priorities, to achieve 
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sustainable development in its three dimensions, which is our overarching goal. In this regard, we 
consider green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication as one of 
the important tools available for achieving sustainable development and that it could provide options 
for policymaking but should not be a rigid set of rules. We emphasize that it should contribute to 
eradicating poverty as well as sustained economic growth, enhancing social inclusion, improving 
human welfare and creating opportunities for employment and decent work for all, while maintaining 
the healthy functioning of the Earth’s ecosystems.’ (para. 56) 
As it can be inferred, climate change is portrayed by the Rio+20 outcomes not as a dominant but 
rather as an interlinked policy objective, which presents as serious challenge and threat to sustainable 
development. The green economy, on the other hand, is reaffirmed as a policy concept providing 
alternatives and setting goals to pursue sustainable development, including moving towards a low 
carbon society. Finally, sustainable development was reaffirmed by the international community as an 
overarching goal, perhaps the broadest goal to be pursued at all levels of governance. It remains also 
as a recognized norm operating in international law (despite not being recognized as a customary IL 
principle) and informing the operation of its regimes. Viewed in these ways, these three issues can be 
seen as complimentary and mutually supportive. 
 
  
 
